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INTERDEPENDENCIES, FAMILIES, AND
CHILDREN
Karen Czapanskiy*
I. INTRODUCTION
Law addresses the needs and miseries of children
through a variety of interventions designed to protect or
advance a child's .best interests. The term "best interests,"
however, lacks content: how can one to tell whether a
proposed intervention protects or advances a child's "best
interests?" The solution I propose in this article is called
"interdependency theory."
Interdependency theory rests on the belief that every
child needs a caregiver, and every caregiver needs support
from other people and institutions. The role of law, whether
family law, juvenile justice law, public benefits law, tax law,
or employment law,' should be to respect the caregiver's
* Professor, University of Maryland School of Law; BA, University of
California at Berkeley; JD, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks are
due to many people who have helped me cultivate this article. I am especially
grateful to the students in my 1996 seminar at the University of Maryland
School of Law and to my research assistants, Susan Testa, Joe Henry, Paul
DeSantis, Nancy Hochberger, and Meverette Smith. Particularly helpful
readers have included Kate Bartlett, Peg Brinig, Naomi Cahn, June Carbone,
Dana Czapanskiy, Martha Fineman, Elizabeth Samuels, Becky Sander, Jana
Singer, and Joan Williams. I have been enriched by the insights of audiences at
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School, and a faculty forum at Southern Methodist University Law School.
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1. The examples in this article arise in family law, but other fields are
fertile for examination. In juvenile justice, for example, one could examine the
relationship between a charge that a parent has neglected a child and a charge
that a parent who has been abused has failed to protect a child. See Jane
Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare
"Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 745 (1998). In
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commitment, hard work, and knowledge and understanding
of the child by according him or her maximum autonomy,
authority, and assistance. At the same time, law needs to
encourage and support people and institutions that provide
help to the caregiver, who in turn helps the child to grow.
According to the theory, a proposed legal intervention is
acceptable only when it supports caregivers in maximizing
their ability to care for a child. A proposed legal intervention
is unacceptable when it impedes a caregiver's ability to do
what is best for a child.
In this article, I explore interdependency theory as it
applies to family law, in the context of visitation with a child
public benefits law, one could examine the welfare-to-work requirements in
relationship to a caregiver's decisions about a child's needs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 et
seq. (West Supp. 1998). In tax law, one could compare the earned-income tax
credit with the dependent care credit to determine whether both operate in
ways that support caregivers. Compare 26 U.S.C.A. § 32 (West Supp. 1998),
with 26 U.S.C.A. § 21 (West Supp. 1998). In employment law, one could
examine the impact of the employment at will doctrine as well as the nature of a
voluntary quit in unemployment law. See Sharon Dietrich et al., Work Reform:
The Other Side of Welfare Reform, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 53, 62 (1998)
(explaining that two thirds of states require the reason for leaving a job to be
job-related; 32 states explicitly disqualify those who leave to perform domestic
obligations). See generally JOAN WILLIAMS, RECONSTRUCTING GENDER
(forthcoming 1999) (arguing that Title VII may provide a remedy for workers
who need to combine paid employment with parenting); Martin H. Malin,
Unemployment Compensation in a Time of Increasing Work-Family Conflicts, 29
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 131 (1996); Deborah Maranville, Feminist Theory and Legal
Practice: A Case Study on Unemployment Compensation Benefits and the Male
Norm, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1081 (1992). In a similar vein, Professor Jane
Rutherford proposed that children be represented in the political process
through proxy voters, usually their parents. Jane Rutherford, One Child, One
Vote: Proxies for Parents, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1463, 1502-06 (1998).
A personal experience could have become an insurance law problem. When
I was pregnant with my younger child, I developed carpal tunnel syndrome,
which left both hands temporarily crippled to the point that I was unable to
hold a glass of water, much less an infant. Doctors predicted that the condition
would abate within a few months after the child's birth, but, in the meantime,
everyone agreed that it would be safer if someone else, such as a home
healthcare worker, carried my child. My insurance company took the position
that the health problem was mine rather than my child's. Since the healthcare
worker was needed for the care of someone who was not sick, insurance was not
available. However, if I dropped the child and he was injured, then he would
have a health problem covered by insurance. Fortunately, the condition abated
quickly and I enjoyed substantial family support in the meantime, so the baby
was not dropped. What the insurance company did, however, is a perfect
example of a negative interaction with a caregiver/child unit. The insurance
company failed to see us as a unit with an integrated health problem and
refused to see its own role as supporting the unit.
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by a person not living in the child's household. Future
articles will address the application of the theory in other
settings, such as public benefits and alimony.
Law is often oblivious to the needs of caregivers despite
the fact that society relies on caregivers to raise children.
The following four examples, drawn from my clinical practice,
illustrate this point.2
Example 1
A father of two preschoolers is HIV+. Although not yet
seriously ill, he wanted to make plans for the children if he
dies before they are grown, as is likely. Their mother, also
HIV+, abandoned the children when they were infants, sees
them infrequently, and remains involved with illegal drugs.
In Maryland, a non-marital biological father can legally adopt
his children to establish his legal fatherhood and terminate
the legal parenthood of the biological mother. Termination of
the mother's rights is permitted if she has deserted the child,
so it would be permitted in this case.3 As the sole legal
parent, the father would enjoy the exclusive right to decide
who cares for the children after his death. Otherwise, the
mother's rights would remain equal to the father's rights.4
Hopeful that the mother will change, the father wanted an
intermediate path allowing her the dignity of the title of, and
an incentive to act in any way as a mother, but allowing him,
the children's caregiver, the peace of mind of knowing that
someone he trusts will look after the children. The law,
however, gives him no intermediate path.5
2. Because my clients suffer from many of the problems that accompany
poverty, these examples may seem extreme, so additional examples appear
throughout the article.
3. Bridges v. Nicely, 497 A.2d 142 (Md. 1985) (holding that a natural
father of nonmarital child permitted to adopt child); see MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 5-312 (Supp. 1997) (allowing adoption without the consent of the natural
parent if a child is in the care of a relative for more than six months who is
seeking an adoption and the natural parent has deserted or harmed the child).
4. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-23 (1991) (stating that parents are joint
natural guardians of a minor child).
5. The closest thing to an acceptable solution is the Standby Guardian Law
that permits a terminally ill parent to create a guardianship activated upon the
death or disability of the parent. MD. CODE ANN., ESTATES & TRUSTS §§ 13-901
et seq. (Supp. 1997). The other parent retains the right to revoke the
guardianship, however, even if he or she agreed to its establishment. Id. at §
13-904(h).
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Example 2
A mother of an elementary age child divorced her
husband after enduring several severe beatings. Unable to
prove that visitation between the child and the father would
put the child at risk,6 she agreed to a visitation order and
cooperated with visitation. Throughout the child's early
adolescence, the father preached to the child that the child's
mother had deserted the father for no reason and had used
the divorce to steal his family's home. In middle adolescence,
the child went to live with the father. During a visit to the
mother's home to retrieve some belongings, the child attacked
the mother. He left her bruised and nursing a broken finger.
Although the mother and child eventually reconciled, their
relationship remains difficult and the child, now a young
man, is quite troubled.
Example 3
A child was born to a woman and man as the result of a
sexual encounter during a brief relationship. When the child
was born, the woman was seeing another man, with whom
she established a long-term relationship. The child regarded
the mother and her partner as her parents, and their children
as her siblings. Because the family applied for public benefits
when the child was young, the woman was required to assign
her rights to child support and cooperate in establishing the
paternity of the child's biological father.7 Paternity was
established and a child support order entered, but few
payments were made, and the biological father made little
effort to see the child. The woman died after a long illness
while the child was still young. She identified the stepfather
as the person who should act as the child's guardian, but the
guardianship was at risk of being terminated if the biological
father should ever object.8 The stepfather sought to adopt the
child. The process took over a year, however, largely because
the law required the caregiver to obtain the consent of the
biological father or demonstrate that finding him was
6. The case arose before 1991, when Maryland law was amended to require
the court to take into account the safety of the custodial parent when ordering
visitation. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-101.1(c) (Supp. 1997).
7. MD. CODE ANN., Art. 88A, § 50(b)(2) (Supp. 1997).
8. See supra note 5.
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impossible.' The fact that the biological father had not
contacted the child or kept the mother or caregiver apprised
of his location was not sufficient proof that adoption by the
caregiver was proper.
Example 4
A woman adopted a young child whose biological mother
was too disabled by mental illness to care for her. As she
grew, the child developed a similar mental illness. Although
it was extremely difficult, her adoptive mother provided care
and mental health treatment. Nonetheless, as a teenager,
the child engaged in some risky activities, including a
relationship with an abusive, older man, who was convicted of
assaulting her. During the same time period, another man
raped the teenager and was later convicted. One of the men
impregnated the teenager. She was unable to care for the
baby, so the grandmother, with the teenager's consent, began
caring for the baby as her own. When the teenager was about
to turn eighteen, the grandmother became concerned that the
teenager might change her mind about leaving the baby in
her care. The court refused to consider the grandmother's
petition for guardianship, however, unless she served the two
men who might be the biological father. The grandmother
withdrew the petition to avoid subjecting the mentally fragile
teenager to the trauma of testifying again about the assault
and the rape she had endured.
In representing these caregivers, I became convinced that
the law gave them a raw deal. They assumed the care of
children and stuck with them through some extremely hard
times. They were respectful of other people and institutions
that were part of the children's lives. They have done their
very best. Yet, their best is never enough. Other people and
institutions, with the help of the law, can intervene in the
relationship of the caregiver and child. And other people and
institutions, with the help of the law, bear no responsibility to
9. Because the biological father had been adjudicated as the legal father in
a paternity proceeding, the adoption could not proceed without his consent
unless there were unusual circumstances. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-
312 (Supp. 1997). Even though state child support officials had been unable to
locate the father for years, it was up to petitioner to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that his efforts to locate the absent parent were adequate.
See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-312(c)(2)(iii) (Supp. 1997).
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support the caregiver in helping the child. The caregiver
alone raises the child, bears the risk of losing the
relationship, and has no right to demand support, or even
respect, for the caregiving he or she provides.
Society needs to address the reality that these roadblocks
to caregiving harm not only the caregivers, but also the
children in their care. Society entrusts children to caregivers
because we believe that society cannot raise children as well
as individuals can.1° Caregivers cannot perform their job,
however, without the promise and the reality of social and
legal support.
When the caregiver's needs are neglected, the caregiver
cannot meet the children's needs. Our collective failure to
attend to the caregiver's needs helps explain some of the
misery, deprivation, and abuse suffered by children in the
United States. A fifth of children in the U.S. live below the
poverty line.1" Over 400,000 are in the foster care system,2
and almost 80,000 are under the supervision of juvenile
authorities, in jail, or in prison.13
In the context of family relations, the best interests of the
child test is used to determine whether an outcome is
desirable. 14  Interdependency theory challenges current
10. See Bill J. Clinton, 1994 State of the Union Address, 30 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 148 (January 25, 1994) (stressing responsibility of parents for the
futures of their children); Peter Baker, Clinton Pushes Child Care Bill, The
WASHINGTON POST, May 10, 1998, at A6 (remarks of President Clinton
advocating increased funding for child care: "As Mother's Day reminds us,
governments don't raise children. Parents do.").
11. FEDERAL INTERAGENCY FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY STATISTICS,
AMERICA'S CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL INDICATORS OF WELL BEING 10, 70 (1998)(illustrating that in 1996, 31% of children under the age of 18, who were related
to the householder, lived under 150% of the poverty line, while 21% lived below
the poverty line).
12. 442,000 children were in foster care at the end of the 1992 fiscal year.
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 103 CONG., 2D SESS, OVERVIEW OF
ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1994 GREENBOOK 640 tbl. 14-14 (1994).
13. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, Facts on Youth, Violence, and Crime (June
18, 1998) <http://www.childrensdefense.orgsafestart-facts.html> (indicating
that in 1996, 8,100 juveniles were being held in adult jails; while in 1995,
69,075 children were held in juvenile public custody facilities).
14. The best interests of the child is a multi-factored test that requires the
court to exercise its discretion after considering evidence of factors such as the
child's and parents' wishes as to custody; the child's primary caretaker; the
nature and extent of the child's relationship with parents, siblings and
community; the child's age, maturity, gender, mental and physical health,
culture and religion; the parents' fitness, economic status, maturity, morality,
religion, physical and mental health, dedication to the child, the effect on the
962 [Vol. 39
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versions of the best interests test because it requires that the
child be viewed as a member of a care-giving unit, not as an
independent being whose "best interests" can be determined
separate from the need to be cared for. Interdependency
theory dictates that the child's life be viewed in its entirety,
beginning with the fundamental connection of the child to the
specific person or people who care for the child every day
because they have a long term commitment to the child's
development and well being. The theory also challenges the
"best interests" notion by recognizing that no caregiver acts
alone. Caregivers depend on other adults and institutions,
just as society depends on caregivers. Also, under
interdependency theory, supporting adults are not identified
by status, such as spouse or grandparent. Instead, they are
identified by their supporting behaviors, a change that
valorizes and gives content to the role of the supporting
caregiver.
Under interdependency theory, opportunities for private
parties to use courts to intervene in the lives and decisions of
caregivers would be far fewer than they are today.
Interventions would be allowed only to reward someone who
has behaved as a supporting caregiver. A claim based solely
on status or a legal relationship would not be cognizable.
Consequently, a variety of claims that could succeed under
the current best interests test would be eliminated.
Examples include certain parental and grand-parental
visitation claims where the proposed visitors have no history
of supporting the lead caregiver.
Restricting judicial intervention would improve the life of
the child at a practical level by reducing opportunities for
conflict.15 Further, the lead caregiver could insist that people
who want contact with the child provide the caregiver with
child of physical abuse by one parent on the other; and the willingness of each
parent to allow the other access to the child. See PETER N. SWISHER, ET AL.,
FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1091-1155 (2d. ed. 1998).
States vary somewhat as to which factors may be considered and what weight
each should have. Id.
15. See PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING
UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL 78, 202 (1997) (negative effects of divorce
on children are mediated by maternal and paternal support during adolescence
and amplified by post-divorce conflict over custody, child support, visitation and
child-rearing); see also Janet M. Bowermaster, Relocation Custody Disputes
Involving Domestic Violence, 46 KAN. L. REV. 433, 447-48 (1998).
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support, since providing support to the caregiver is the only
route of access to the child. On an emotional level, the theory
contributes to the sense of respect a lead caregiver can enjoy,
because the work he or she does for the child and his or her
deep knowledge of the child gain a more prominent role. He
or she regains some of the authority that a lead caregiver
needs to perform the work of caring for a dependent child.
Further, restricting intervention adds to the lead caregiver's
security by eliminating judicial contests over claims by people
who have not provided assistance and support. At the same
time, it contributes to the financial security of the
caregiver/child unit by eliminating the need for the lead
caregiver to defend against some judicial challenges.
Some adults who can now intervene in the child's life
would be precluded from doing so. Examples include those
who qualify for visitation orders solely because of their status
as a legal or biological parent or as a grandparent, those who
are allowed to exercise visitation without regard to whether
their behavior toward the caregiver is respectful or abusive,
and those who are unreliable about exercising visitation
rights. The costs of their exclusion are outweighed by the
benefits to the child of supporting the caregiver/child unit. By
restricting judicial intervention to those who have behaved as
supportive caregivers, the child is ensured of continuing
contact with people who are committed to the child's well-
being, and recognize that the security and well-being of the
caregiver are important to the child. Restricting judicial
intervention provides an incentive for more people to behave
supportively toward the lead caregiver on whom the child
depends, and for fewer people to behave as if the adult's
desires were all that mattered.
Interdependency theory would improve the lives of many
caregivers, including those I have represented. Improving the
lives of the caretakers also improves the lives of the children
they care for. In the case of the HIV+ father concerned about
his children's future, the father would be empowered to name
the person who would become the children's guardian after
his death. Their mother would be able to see the children,
but would not be able to use the law to disrupt their
placement. In the case where the former husband used
violence to assert his authority over the mother and taught
their young child the same behavior, the mother would have
964 [Vol. 39
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authority to restrict the father's access to the child until the
child reached adolescence. At that point, the father would
have the right to contact the child and invite a relationship.
The stepfather whose continued guardianship of the child he
raised was threatened by the child's absent biological father
would be relieved of that concern. The biological father would
lose the right to intervene because of his absence from the
child's life and lack of support for the child/caregiver unit.
And the grandmother whose commitment was a lifeline to her
daughter and granddaughter, would not have to struggle with
absent, uncommitted, and potentially violent putative fathers
in order to continue caring for her grandchild.
Social commentators are split as to whether the help that
children need should come from-inside or outside their
families, or from society at large. For some, the principal
explanation for children's misery is the structure of their
families. These commentators focus on the fact that parents
divorce or never marry and attribute much of the decline in
children's well-being to the single-parent structures of their
families." For others, the principal explanation for children's
misery is found in the economic and social structures that
provide parents with inadequate resources and substandard
conditions for raising children. These commentators find the
sources of children's misery in the nature of work, poverty,
social benefits, educational systems, and in social practices
such as racism and sexism."
The first group, whom I call interventionists, proposes
remedies that intervene in the family life of children. They
may seek to limit access to divorce, prefer joint custody of
children, and often insist on enhancing the enforceability of
visitation orders. The second group, whom I call
protectionists, propose solutions that simultaneously shelter
the homes of children from tampering by government and
third parties while enlarging public resources dedicated to
children and the people who care for them.
Both groups have identified only a portion of a solution.
16. Interventionist thinkers discussed in this article include David
Blankenhorn, Sylvia Hewlett, and Cornel West. See infra note 111.
17. Protectionist thinkers discussed in this article include Joseph Goldstein,
Anna Freud and Albert J. Solnit. See infra note 72. Martha Albertson Fineman
is discussed as a protectionist thinker. See infra note 62. Finally, Nancy D.
Polikoff is also discussed as a protectionist thinker. See infra note 87.
9651999]
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Interventionists understand that children need more of
society's resources than they currently receive. They identify
nonresidential fathers as the best source of additional
resources, and understand that persuading adults to share
resources with children requires a combination of
encouragement and coercion. The protectionists understand
that parenting is a difficult job that requires freedom and
autonomy. Structural constraints on parental freedom result
in more, rather than fewer, difficulties. Protectionists also
understand that, in general, women get little respect for
nurturing, no matter how well they might do it. Finally, they
recognize that society in general needs to devote more
resources to children. 8
Both groups, however, fail to understand other
fundamentals. Reforms proposed by interventionists increase
the burdens on custodial parents, even though these adults
are the ones demonstrating a daily commitment to children.
At the same time, some interventionists ignore the many
people other than non-custodial parents who join custodial
parents to provide for children. Many deny or downplay the
need for the government or business to provide more financial
support for children. Protectionists, on the other hand, fail to
acknowledge the need to reward people who help single
parents. Simply freeing caregivers from hierarchical controls
does not provide them with the help they need, whether that
help comes from other adults or from institutions. In other
words, one group relies too heavily on controlling caregivers,
while the other group over-emphasizes individualism. One
group advocates governmental interventions that would
impair the abilities of caregivers; while the other group seeks
to limit interventions that might provide caregivers with
needed assistance.
Interdependency theory attempts to strike a balance by
18. Professor Naomi Cahn argues that convergences such as these
constitute a new morality that is emerging in family law. Naomi R. Cahn, The
Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225 (1997). In her view,
the new morality "addresses family values, promotes acceptance of broader
definitions of family, and draws on notions of fairness and equality." Id. at 245.
Interdependency theory is both a part of, and critical of, the new morality
envisioned by Professor Cahn. While embracing the notion that the care of
children is the central task of families, however constituted, I remain concerned
that both autonomy and connection needs of caregivers may be under
emphasized. See id. at 269-70 (discussing similar concerns).
966 [Vol. 39
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measuring the appropriateness of a proposed intervention
against the needs of a child and caregiver, considering them
as a single unit. The caregiver's job is to help the child
mature, to the best of the caregiver's ability. Because the
typical child is raised by caregivers, rather than communally,
society is dependent on caregivers to provide for children, and
it acts on children, especially younger ones, through their
caregivers. No caregiver raises a child completely alone;
however, every caregiver depends on a variety of people and
institutions to provide support of many kinds. Under
interdependency theory, interventions into the caregiver-child
unit are permitted only to the extent necessary to recognize
and support the interdependency of the unit, as well as those
people and institutions who support the caregiver and on
whom the caregiver depends. 9
Under interdependency theory, the question of whether
and how law should intervene in the caregiver-child unit is
measured by whether the intervention is supportive of the
caregiver-child unit.2" "Supportive" means that the
intervention assists, or at least does not impede, the caregiver
in doing the best job she or he can do for the child. What the
theory rejects is the claim that society can successfully
intervene directly in the life of a young child without going
through the caregiver. Interdependency theory assumes the
opposite: that the caregiver stands at the threshold between a
child and society. Society is dependent on the caregiver to
care for the young child; thus what society can do best for the
child is to support the caregiver.
In this article, I examine the intervention question in the
context of visitation rights. When a court enters a visitation
order, it intervenes into the caregiver-child unit by telling the
caregiver who the child will spend time with and when. The
19. The cases at issue here do not include situations where the child should
be removed from the caregiver because of abuse, assuming that the removal
would be proper. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
20. I am assuming legal systems consisting of rewards and punishments
have a role in encouraging and discouraging certain behaviors. Under
interdependency theory, behaviors that are encouraged are those leading adults
and institutions to support caregivers in ways that permit caregivers to do the
best job of which they are able for the dependent child. Behaviors that are
discouraged are those impairing or impeding caregivers. So the question for law
is, does a proposed legal intervention serve to assist caregivers, or does it get in
the way?
9671999]
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intervention is measured under the "best interests of the
child" standard. What constitutes the best interests of the
child is the subject of a debate between two irreconcilable
positions. The dominant position identifies the child's best
interests with continuing contact between the child and both
parents. The other position identifies the child's best
interests with support for the child's primary caregiver.
Neither position is fully satisfactory. Alternative principles
are needed to determine the relationships between adults and
children who do not live together. Interdependency theory is
an effort to articulate those principles.
Under the dominant best interests theory, the ability to
get a visitation order depends largely on the adult's status in
relationship to the child. A non-custodial parent is rarely
denied visitation." Likewise, a grandparent of a child living
in a single parent home will rarely be denied visitation
rights.2 A non-adoptive stepparent, on the other hand, has
21. The universal rule is that the non-custodial parent is awarded visitation
in nearly all circumstances. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A
NUTSHELL § 18.15 (3d ed. 1995); CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINING,
AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW, PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PERSPECTIVES 683
(1996). In extreme cases, however, a non-custodial parent may be denied
visitation. See, e.g., Soltis v. Soltis, 470 So.2d 1250 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)
(parent's drug addiction); Nelson v. Jones, 781 P.2d 964 (Alaska 1989) (parent
sexually abused child); In re Two Minor Children, 249 A.2d 743 (Del. 1969)
(absolute refusal of child to cooperate); Painter v. Painter, 688 A.2d 479 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1997) (finding visits causing psychological detriment to child,
resulting in suicide attempt, may cause actual physical harm and are
terminable), cert. denied, 693 A.2d 355 (Md. 1997); Kuth v. Simonson, No. Cl-
97-923, 1997 Minn. App. LEXIS 975 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1997) (failing to
comply with court-ordered counseling for batterers, a requisite to visitation, was
cause for denial of father's visitation, as such visitation would harm child
emotionally), review denied, 1997 Minn. LEXIS 816 (Minn. October 21, 1997);
Nielson v. Neilson, 348 N.W.2d 416 (Neb. 1984) (father murdered children's
maternal grandparents); Johntonny v. Malliski, 588 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Ct. App.
1990) (finding no purpose served by forcing visitation upon child suffering from
intense fear and dislike of parent); In re Jones, 462 P.2d 680 (Or. Ct. App. 1978)
(severe conflict between parents); Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn.
1988) (violence or threat of violence). See also Bowermaster, supra note 15, at
449 (visitation by father with history of violence toward mother rarely denied or
supervised).
22. Legislation provides for "grandparent visitation" in forty-nine states.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (Supp. 1997); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie
1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (West 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103
(Michie 1998); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
19-1-117 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031(7) (Supp. 1996); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 752.01 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (Supp. 1998); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 571-46(7) (Michie 1997); IDAHO CODE § 32-719 (Michie 1996); 750
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more difficulty obtaining a visitation order, as do others in
relationships with the caregiver or child that are not defined
by blood or marriage.23
ILL. COMP. STAT. ILL. 5/607(b)(1) (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-5-1
(Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1998); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §38-129 (1993); KY REV. STAT. §405.021 (West Supp. 1997); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (West Supp. 1998); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1803
(West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39D (West Supp. 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.27b (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1997 & Supp.
1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3 (Supp. 1998); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.402
(West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-
1802 (Michie 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125A.330 (Michie 1993); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (1992 & Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West
Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2(bl) (Michie 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
72 (McKinney Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05.1(B)(1) (Anderson
Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. §
109.121 (Supp. 1996); 23 PA. CONST. STAT. §§ 5310-5314 (West 1991); R.I. GEN.
LAwS § 15-5-24.3 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 25-4-52 (Michie 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-6-302 (Supp. 1997); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (West Supp. 1998);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1013 (1989);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.15B (1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240
(West 1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-2-5 (Supp. 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245
(West Supp. 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie Supp. 1998). Courts
will also impose grandparent visitation in certain instances. Courts tend to
distinguish between single-parent and two-parent intact families when
imposing such visitation, with the distinction apparently predicated on a
presumption of unfitness of a single mother and a presumption that such an
intrusion into an intact, two-parent family violates family privacy. See Karen
Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing
Interdependency Theory in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315, 1331-1350 (1994).
Compare Spence v. Stewart, 705 So.2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (imposing
grandparent visitation over the objections of custodial mother predicted on a
notion of de facto waiver of familial privacy due to prior engagement with court
system in paternity action) and Olsen v. Olsen, 534 N.W.2d 547 (Minn. 1995)
(despite custodial mother's objections, finding that grandparent visitation is in
child's best interest) with Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 1996) (denying
grandparent visitation based on a lack of compelling state interest in imposing
such visitation where the family is intact) and Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573
(Tenn. 1993) (applying Grandparent Visitation Act to married couple whose
fitness as parents is unchallenged violates state constitutional right to privacy
in parenting decisions). In certain instances, courts have ordered grandparent
visitation where the "intact" family resulted from a stepparent adoption. See
Loftin v. Smith, 590 So.2d 323 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991); In re Adoption of A.M.R.,
527 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. App. 1996). Contra, Russo v. Persico, 706 So.2d 933
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (grandparent visitation order after stepparent
adoption unconstitutional).
23. Currently legislation provides explicity for stepparent visitation in only
eight states. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1301 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-1616(b) (Supp. 1997); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 136 (West Supp. 1998); N.H.
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Interdependency theory rejects status as a basis for
visitation decisions. The theory relies instead on function, by
focusing on whether the potential visitor has a history of
providing the child-caregiver unit with support in a reliable
and respectful way, and whether that supportive relationship
will continue. In addition, if a person with a visitation order
ceases to behave in a supportive, reliable, and respectful
manner, the visitation order would be rescinded. Thus, under
interdependency theory, some formerly married non-custodial
parents and many grandparents would be denied visitation,
whereas some people who are unrelated to a child would be
granted visitation. On the other hand, where a person has a
history of providing the caregiver-child unit with support in a
reliable and respectful manner, interdependency theory
authorizes visitation even though the caregiver might
disagree. Such a constraint on any individual caregiver is
needed to encourage support for all caregivers. Rather than
calling the caregiver a "custodian" and the supporting adult a
"visitor," the roles are renamed "lead caregiver" and
"supporting caregiver." The next section explores the
meanings of these and other terms.
II. THE TERMS OF ART
A. Who Qualifies as a "Child"?
Interdependency theory applies when a child needs an
intermediary for interactions with the world outside the
home. Infants obviously qualify, as do children too young for
school. A child's ability to negotiate the world without a
caregiver's intervention increases as the child develops.24 For
REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.17VI (1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(2) (Supp. 1996);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-303 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241A.6 (Michie
Supp. 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (Supp. 1997). However, a number of
states have enacted visitation statutes worded broadly enough to give courts the
discretion to order such visitation, bringing the total number to roughly a third.
See John Dewitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal
Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 361 (1998). See generally, MARGARET
A. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW 129-137 (1994) (stepparents in most
states face jurisdictional hurdles to visitation).
24. See PENELOPE LEACH, CHILDREN FIRST: WHAT OUR SOCIETY MUST
DO-AND IS NOT DOING-FOR OUR CHILDREN TODAY 68, 90-91, 144-45 (1994):
Somebody must laugh at first jokes, applaud first steps, read stories
and steer her between the rock and the hard place of toddlerhood so
that she can emerge unscathed into socialized childhood and the new
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most children, there comes a point in adolescence when
caregivers have little to do in terms of intermediation
between the child and the world at large.25 At that point,
joys of "my friends" and "my teacher." And even then, somebody must
be there to welcome her home and then launch her again on each fresh
leap into life.
Id. at 68.
25. Professor Janet Dolgin has described and raised concerns about recent
moves in the law to distinguish adolescents from younger children. Janet L.
Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child
Relationship, 61 ALBANY L. REV. 345, 350 (1997). In her view, the law is
inclined to protect children, even though imperfectly, while adolescents are
more likely to be viewed as autonomous and in need of little protection or
support. Id. at 428. While the law could be refined to offer a more nuanced
balance between autonomy and protection, it seems more likely to Professor
Dolgin that the separation of adolescence from childhood will lead to a
redefinition of children, excluding infants, as being "little adults" who will be
increasingly indistinguishable under the law. Id. at 428-29, 431. The results
appear dire:
If society continues to understand children as inherently different from
adults, as vulnerable, immature, and in need of adult guidance, then
children face the risk that, without the support of enduring familial
settings, they will never mature, that they will in effect, remain
adolescents throughout life .... But if, instead of relying on parental
substitutes, society redefines children, and if, further, the almost
unrelenting generalization and elaboration of individualism within
American culture does lead to the amalgamation of childhood and
adulthood, the consequences for children will likely be unfortunate,
unless - and little beyond whim or hope suggests this to be the case -
children really are "little adults" almost from the start.
Id. at 430-31.
I agree with Professor Dolgin's dire prediction as well as with her call for a
more nuanced legal approach to the process of maturity. I understand one of
her central points to be the need to trust families more so that the adults in a
child's life can be trustworthy substitute decisionmakers for the child. It is
critical to interdependency theory that one or more adults who are committed to
the child be given the authority needed to act in the child's interest. I argue
against the distribution of that authority to courts and to other adults
(including a nonresidential parent) unless it is clear that the shared authority
supports a co-resident adult's care-giving for the child. My prediction is that
the trust placed in the lead caregiver will translate into better caregiving for the
child. As Professor Dolgin notes, a child needs the "support of enduring familial
settings" to successfully make the leap from childhood to adulthood. Id. at 430
(emphasis added).
Where I disagree with Professor Dolgin is in the idea that law is better off
not distinguishing between children and adolescents, because I think that the
slope need not be as slippery as she describes. For example, giving an
adolescent some independence in regard to his or her relationship to a
nonresident parent, as I propose, is not a valid reason to view that adolescent as
capable of making all of his or her medical or educational decisions or to hold
him or her criminally liable as an adult. Instead, it is an appropriately
measured introduction into one of the many responsibilities of adulthood, that
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interdependency theory is less salient, although it should
continue to be applied in some circumstances. Most such
circumstances lie outside the realm of family law, so they will
be explored elsewhere."6
B. Who is the "Lead Caregiver"?
Rights and responsibilities under interdependency theory
begin in the child-caregiver unit, so it is critical to determine
who the lead caregiver is. For many children, the answer to
the question is simple: they live with one adult, usually the
mother, who assumes responsibility for their care, and for
interdependency purposes, is the lead caregiver.
Most children live in two-parent homes and some live in
homes with two adults. As between the two parents or
adults, who is the lead caregiver? So long as the household
continues unchanged, there is no need to identify a lead
caregiver because more than one adult can qualify if each is
committed to the child, performs caregiving responsibilities
as well as he or she can, and acts respectfully toward other
caregivers. From the perspective of the child's wellbeing, as
viewed through interdependency theory, the best thing
society can do is support co-residential caregivers in their
mutual commitment to caregiving work.
If the household composition changes, however, under
interdependency theory the lead caregiver will be the one
vested with the larger share of authority in regard to the
child. At that point, therefore, it is important to identify the
lead caregiver. Custody law offers a variety of possible rules,
but the one most congruent with interdependency theory is
of deciding how to define one's family and relate to its members.
26. Another issue affected by the age of the child is how one determines the
lead caregiver when the child is a newborn. No adult has had an opportunity to
demonstrate a commitment to the child, and several people may be prepared to
make and carry through with a commitment. If they do not share a household,
who should be selected? This is a question intimately connected with complex
adoption questions and too involved to address fully here. See generally Joan
Hollinger, Adoption and Aspiration: The Uniform Adoption Act, The De Boer-
Schmidt Case, and the American Quest for the Ideal Family, 2 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL. 15 (1995). For the moment, it will have to suffice to say that a
decision needs to be made early in the life of the infant and that, at the same
time, the ability of adults to make an unambiguous commitment to a newborn
should not be overestimated. Therefore, the performance of caregiving must
remain central and should supplant legal or biological parenthood when
necessary.
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an "approximation" rule. 7 Such a rule looks to the prior
caregiving practices of the adults and seeks to approximate
those practices in the future by allocating caregiving
responsibilities along the same lines, to the extent that is
possible. For interdependency theory purposes, the lead
caregiver is the adult who is allocated the bulk of caregiving
responsibilities are allocated.
An approximation rule is congruent with
interdependency theory for a number of reasons. First, it
recognizes the importance to the child of maintaining as
stable a life as possible. The departure of one of the adults in
a household cannot leave a child untouched, but a child
suffers less if the adult who remains is the one who usually
cared for the child. Entrusting the child to that person may
enhance the child's sense of security and stability.28 Second,
giving the lead caregiver a legal privilege identifies his or her
caregiving work as something important and worthy of
reward. Third, it provides all the adults in a child's life with
greater incentives to put the child's needs first, because their
opportunities to spend time with the child and to make
decisions for the child after a separation depend on their
caregiving practices before the separation. Fourth, it
27. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.09 (Tentative Draft No. 3 1998); see Elizabeth S. Scott,
Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 630
(1992).
28. See generally 1 JOSEPH D. NOSHPITZ & ROBERT A. KING, PATHWAYS OF
GROWTH, ESSENTIALS OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY 186 (1991) (stating that some
babies after forced separation from caregivers fall into state of withdrawal and
depression); Eleanor Willemsen & Kristen Marcel, Attachment 101 for
Attorneys: Implications for Infant Placement Decisions, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
439, 440-42 (1996) (reviewing basics of attachment theory; children who form
insecure attachments with their parents tend to have greater difficulties later
in life). But see JEROME KAGAN, TEMPERAMENT IN HUMAN NATURE (1994);
JUDITH RICH HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTION (1998).
29. Two researchers reported recently that states that permit courts to
order joint custody also experience significantly lower rates of divorce than
states that do not. Margaret F. Brinig & F. H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding
and Monitoring Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393, 393 (1998). They argue that the
reason for this is that a spouse who is likely to lose custody under a sole custody
regime-the father-is more likely to engage in the many daily events that lead
to bonding with his children when he is given reason to be optimistic that, in
the event of a divorce, he will be awarded joint custody and thereby remain an
important presence in the lives of his children. Id. at 394-96. Moreover, such
participation in family matters also leads to further bonding with his wife, thus
lowering the likelihood of divorce. Id. at 411-417, 423.
I agree with Brinig and Buckley that the possibility of joint custody should
1999]
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discourages each caregiver in a joint household from behaving
disrespectfully or unsupportively toward another caregiver,
because such conduct may lead to separation or divorce and
the predictable consequences of less time with, and
diminished authority over, a child.
Sometimes parents or other adults who share a home
with a child allocate their child-rearing roles badly. For
example, where traditional gender roles are the basis for the
allocation decision, a father more inclined toward nurturing
may still spend more time at work and less time at home than
a mother less inclined toward nurturing."° If the moment of
separation is also the moment when the father decides to
change his lifestyle so that he can spend more time with the
children, it may seem logical to give him a larger share of
parental responsibility and authority after separation than
an approximation rule would provide. Indeed, the parents
may see the logic of that result and decide to allocate
responsibilities in exactly that way. If they do,
interdependency theory would prevent a court from second-
lead to lower rates of divorce, but I think their analysis is inadequate in one
important respect. Brinig and Buckley portray the prospect of joint custody as
merely reducing the father's fear of losing access to his child after divorce. Id.
at 402. This implies that joint custody itself does not provide any incentive to
the father to invest in the child, but rather removes the disincentive created
under a sole custody regime. If joint custody were awarded to every divorcing
father solely on the basis of his fatherhood, Brinig and Buckley's reasoning
would suffice. It is not the case, however, that joint custody is awarded in most
states purely on proof of marital paternity. The more common rule requires the
court to examine the prior caregiving practices of both parents. Where a father
has engaged in few or none of the daily tasks that lead to bonding, that father is
unlikely to be awarded joint custody. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
124(1.5) (1987) (court considers whether the past roles of the parents "indicate
an ability as joint custodians to provide a positive and nourishing relationship
with the child"); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 134(12) (West Supp. 1996) (courts
required to consider the caregiving roles previously exercised by both parents);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(5) (Michie 1995) (courts must consider "role each
parent has played and will play in the future, in the upbringing and care of the
child"); Taylor v. Taylor, 482 A.2d 164 (Md. 1985) (considering prior parental
caregiving in a joint custody decision).
A more complete hypothesis, therefore, would be that divorce rates are
lower in states permitting courts to order joint custody because fathers can be
optimistic about their post-divorce contact with their children, and because they
are aware that their chances for joint custody improve as they can demonstrate
that they have done caregiving work before the separation.
30. Cultural barriers exist which keep men from maturing. See Nancy E.
Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 FLA. L. REV. 523, 533-35 (1996); Martin
Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047-49 (1994).
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guessing their decision, because the theory demands that
courts respect the decisions of caregivers. After all, it would
be exceptional for a child's caregivers not to know better than
outsiders, including courts and court-appointed experts, what
is best for the child in their care.
Even though interdependency theory would uphold a
parental decision to vary from historical parenting patterns
at the time of separation, the theory does not require that the
less-nurturing mother cede to the more-nurturing father a
greater degree of responsibility and authority than their
history of caregiving practices would reflect. Although it
seems counter-intuitive, few children are likely to benefit
from giving courts the authority to reject the approximation
rule, even where parents have made less-than-optimal
allocation decisions. First, the judicial process requires that
someone investigate and present evidence about those
decisions to the court. This can be invasive and destabilizing
to both caregivers and children, at a time when both need
predictability. Second, even if a court could obtain all the
knowledge and expertise that the caregivers and others have
about the child, and if the investigation process were not
itself destabilizing, there is little certainty that a court would
make a better decision than the flawed decision the parents
made. Like parents, courts have biases in favor of some kinds
of parenting and against others. Although most judges would
want to refuse to second-guess parental decision-making, case
law has shown that judges are apt to second-guess parental
decisions in favor of the best interest of the child.3
31. Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) (stating that custody agreements
made by divorcing couples are often clouded by emotions and prejudice and as a
result may not be in the best interest of the child); Taylor v. Taylor, 482 A.2d
164 (Md. 1985) (awarding joint custody of child despite the fact that joint
custody was not sought); Miller v. Miller 620 A.2d 1161 (Pa. Super. 1993)
(holding that trial courts are not bound by an arbitration award concerning
child custody determination). Many states require courts to give deference to
parental arrangements unless the parent's decision would adversely affect the
child. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a-2)(6)(A) (Supp. 1997) (court should
uphold "any custody arrangement that is agreed to by both parents unless clear
and convincing evidence indicates that such an arrangement is not in the best
interest of the minor child"); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-5(b) (Supp. 1998) (court
must uphold a parental agreement unless the court makes specific written
factual findings ... that ... the agreements would not be in the best interests
of the child"); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 132 (West Supp. 1998) ("If the parents
agree who is to have custody, the court shall award custody in accordance with
their agreement unless the best interest of the child requires a different
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As I discuss more fully in the next section, the
disappointed father is not without recourse in terms of his
ongoing role with the children. First, if he behaved
consistently with his nurturing personality before the
separation, the approximation rule should produce a
caregiving order that enables him, as the "supporting
caregiver," to continue to spend time with, and have some
decision making authority for, the children. Second, if he
continues to behave consistently after the separation, it is
likely that the children themselves will decide to spend
increasing amounts of time with their father as they grow
older. Nothing in interdependency theory prevents this
outcome once the children reach adolescence. Third, allowing
courts to correct gender allocation practices when a couple
separates only serves to reinforce gendered practices during
marriage. Leaving the parties with the consequences of their
decisions may inspire some changes so that more couples
begin to allocate child-rearing responsibilities according to
their talents rather than according to their gender.
C. What About the Other Adults in the Child's Life?
Fundamental to interdependency theory is the reality
that caregivers cannot succeed without the involvement of
other adults and institutions. For the purpose of applying
interdependency theory to families, it is important to focus on
the adult who, like the lead caregiver, is committed to the
child, reliably performs caregiving work for the child, and is
respectful of the caregiving work of others. This adult is
identical to the lead caregiver in terms of commitment,
reliability, and respectfulness, but different from the lead
caregiver because he or she is less involved in caring for the
child, and more involved in supporting the lead caregiver. To
emphasize the importance of support, this adult is called the
supporting caregiver.
Role specialization between a lead caregiver and a
supporting caregiver is not inevitable, as many families have
found. Where two adults have equally shared the caregiving,
the approximation rule would result in both qualifying as
award."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § a:2-4(d) (West Supp. 1998) ("court shall order any
custody arrangement which is agreed to by both parents unless it is contrary to
the best interests of the child").
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lead caregivers. After a separation of the household, both
would share the responsibilities and authority that
accompany the role. Family law must recognize, however,
that the dominant form of child-rearing practice involves the
unequal allocation of caregiving.3 2 By applying the same
approximation rule, interdependency theory recognizes role
specialization and continues it into the future lives of the
adults and children.
Generally, the supporting caregiver would be the lead
caregiver's husband.33 In many households, the supporting
caregiver would be an unmarried partner of the lead
caregiver34 or the mother of the lead caregiver.35 On rare
occasions, the supporting caregiver would be a paid sitter or
housekeeper. 6 Most often, the simplest way to identify the
supporting caregiver is to ask whether he or she has lived
with the lead caregiver and the child long enough to establish
a pattern of committed, reliable, and respectful caregiving
and supportive behaviors.37  The period of co-residency may
32. JOSEPH PLECK, WORKING WIVES/WORKING HUSBANDS (1985). From the
1975-1976 National Study of Time Use, it was determined that, of the total time
devoted to "child care as a primary activity," husbands accounted for 20%-33%
in households where the youngest child was aged 6 to 17 (depending on whether
the mother was employed outside the home), and 17%-26% where the youngest
child was aged zero to five. See also ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT:
WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989); cf. THOMAS F.
JUSTER & FRANK B. STAFFORD, INSTITUTE FOR SURVEY RESEARCH, TIME,
GOODS AND WELL BEING (1985) (tracing changes in paternal involvement in
family activity from 1975-1981); Graeme Russell, Primary Caretaking and Role
Sharing Fathers, in THE FATHER'S ROLE: APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 29-57
(Michael E. Lamb ed. 1986); Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The
Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1433-36 (1991).
33. The most common family type in the workplace is the dual earner family
that is composed of a primary male wage earner and a secondary female wage
earner. Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32
ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 445 (1990). In addition to this family type, another 10% of
families are composed of a male wage earner and a female who stays at home.
Id. at 439.
34. There are a growing number of gay and lesbian parents raising children
in families composed of homosexual partners. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child
Has Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in
Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 461, n.2
(1990).
35. ARLENE S. SALUTER, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 9
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports Series P-20, No. 461,
March 1991) (over two million children live in homes with both grandparents or
a grandmother and one parent).
36. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
37. See Czapanskiy, supra note 22, at 1368-69 (discussing custody and
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vary with the age of the child.
On rare occasions, a person who never shared the
household may qualify as a supporting caregiver. This would
be highly unusual, however, given the behaviors that the role
requires. For example, a child may spend every weekday
with a grandparent while the child's parent works. In
addition to the usual daycare tasks required for a young
child, the grandparent, after fully consulting with the parent,
also takes care of routine medical and dental appointments,
school contacts, play group arrangements, and clothes
shopping. Consequently, the parent can spend more time
interacting with the child as fewer of the parent's evening
and weekend hours need to be spent on errands. In addition,
the grandparent does not charge for the daycare services, so
the parent may be able to afford to spend fewer hours at
work, live in a safer neighborhood, and drive a more reliable
car. The parent-child relationship flourishes because of the
grandparent's generous and respectful support of the parent.
The fact that the child goes home with a parent at the end of
each weekday should not be a bar to a finding that the
grandparent is a supporting caregiver.
Whether co-residential or not, the supporting caregiver's
involvement is directly and indirectly beneficial to the child.
Direct benefits are evident in the grandparent example: the
young child receives care from the grandparent, identifies a
visitation standards for grandparents, and proposing similar coresidency test on
basis of usefulness in fostering interrelationship); A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03
(Tentative Draft No. 3 1998):
A de facto parent is an adult, not the child's legal parent, who for a
period that is significant ... has resided with the child and...
regularly has performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the
child, or a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the
parent with whom the child primarily has lived.
Id. Professor Barbara Woodhouse proposes a different test for distinguishing
"kinship of responsibility" from other associations of choice that are not durable
enough to justify legal recognition as family-equivalents. She suggests looking
at the religious and cultural traditions in which the group operates to determine
the intentions of the members. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It All Depends on
What You Mean by Home:" Toward a Communitarian Theory of the
"Nontraditional" Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569. Such an inquiry into context
is no doubt illuminating, but the indeterminacy of the test can be harsh for
family groups that are poorly resourced. Further, the substantive results are
unlikely to vary from a co-residency test, at least in the examples Professor
Woodhouse offers.
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second adult as a reliable person in his or her life, and trusts
a second adult to provide care similar to what the lead
caregiver provides. The indirect benefit, which is usually the
more substantial part of the role, occurs when the supporting
caregiver supports the caregiver financially, emotionally, and
physically so that the lead caregiver can be more attentive to
the child's needs. The grandparent's decision not to ask for
payment for daycare, for example, means nothing directly to
the child, but it is still a substantial indirect benefit because
of the impact on the parent's capacity to devote himself or
herself to the child.
D. What are the Responsibilities and Rights of a Lead
Caregiver and a Supporting Caregiver?
Interdependency theory identifies the lead caregiver as
the person entrusted with the principal responsibility of
caring for the child. For that person to do the job to the best
of her or his abilities, the lead caregiver needs authority as
well as responsibility. The lead caregiver also needs the
assistance of people and institutions beyond the
caregiver/child unit. The extent of the lead caregiver's
authority needs to be sufficient, then, to permit the lead
caregiver to act responsibly on behalf of the child, but not so
extensive that people beyond the caregiver/child unit are
discouraged from providing appropriate assistance to the
caregiver for the child.38
38. A similar argument is made by Professors Elizabeth and Robert Scott,
who assert that the idea of parental rights in family law is best understood in
the context of a fiduciary heuristic. Elizabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Scott,
Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995). That is, the law entrusts
children to their parents to raise with the knowledge that raising children is
both a joy and a burden. Parents will not always act out of selfless devotion to
the child; occasionally, acting in their own self-interest, they will do things that
are less than optimal for the child. Id. at 2413. Society will intervene in two-
parent families only if the parents step too far out of the mainstream, that is,
behaving in a manner that meets the standard of harm or neglect, such as by
failing to send the child to school or be vaccinated, putting a young child to
work, etc. Id. at 2438-39. So long as parents remain reasonably mainstream,
the law does not attempt to manage the parent-child relationship to protect the
child from the effects of the parental conflicts of interest. Id. at 2439. The
Scotts identify the law's forbearance as ex ante compensation for undertaking
the job of parenthood. Id. at 2429-30, 2449.
Interdependency theory begins in a similar place in the claim that society
needs to entrust parents with substantial authority over children. I differ from
the Scotts, however, in rejecting their claim that only two-parent families
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The autonomy of the lead caregiver must be respected.
Autonomy, in this context, has a meaning drawn from
feminist theory. 9 That is, it is the self-governing autonomy of
a connected person who both draws from and gives to others,
rather than the autonomy of a separate person who is entitled
to the respect, but not the involvement, of others.
The rights and responsibilities of the supporting
caregiver complement those of the lead caregiver. That is, he
or she has the responsibility of assisting the lead caregiver to
do the best job he or she can for the child. The supporting
caregiver also has whatever authority is needed congruent
with his or her responsibilities. In addition, because it is
important to encourage people to commit their energies to the
child and because the supporting caregiver role is difficult but
important, the rights should be as broad as possible so long as
they do not intrude inappropriately into the autonomy of the
lead caregiver.
As the person primarily responsible for the child's well
being, the lead caregiver has the duty to make decisions for
should qualify for the compensatory forbearance. In my view, a single parent or
caregiver who exhibits the requisite degree of commitment, responsibility and
reliability is entitled to the same level of deference as legal parents. According
to the Scotts, legal and biological parents acting in pairs experience sufficient
motivation to usually act in the best interests of the child in their care, because
of the combined effect of their biological connection to the child, socialization
about good parenting practices, and bonding with the child. Id. at 2450-51. The
supervisory role of law can be low for such people because their motivation to do
well is strong and because the costs of legal intervention are high, both in terms
of diminished parental motivation and in terms of uncertainty of result.
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA L. REV.
2401, 2452 (1995). In the absence of good empirical evidence to the contrary, I
think we need to assume that the same holds true for single parents and other
committed caregivers who make a decision to care for a child. Further, even if
we were to find that the combined motivational forces have less effect on single
parents or other committed caregivers than they do for legal parents in pairs,
the need to be wary of legal intervention intensifies because the costs to the
child of legal intervention will be higher. A single parent or caregiver will have
fewer resources to present herself accurately in a legal forum, with the
predictable result of less accurate fact finding. Further, if her motivation is
indeed fragile, the unpredictability of the legal proceeding is an incentive to
abandon the job altogether, rather than a motivation to do it better. My
conclusion, therefore, is that the single parent or caregiver must be accorded the
same ex ante compensation as legal parents in pairs.
39. See Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102 YALE L.J.
1265, 1280-81, 1283 (1993) (book review); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving
Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7
(1980).
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the long-term care of the child. In addition, he or she has the
duty to make most of the daily decisions. The supporting
caregiver will have to make decisions while the child is in his
or her care. Because the lead caregiver has the long-term
responsibility, the supporting caregiver must be careful to
make decisions that are respectful of the lead caregiver and
his or her authority. Otherwise, the supporting caregiver can
cause the child to lose respect for the lead caregiver and cause
the lead caregiver unnecessary problems. Likewise, the lead
caregiver must respect the supporting caregiver by
acknowledging the importance of the their support for the
child. Undermining the relationship between the child and
the supporting caregiver does not benefit the child. "
The introduction of a new partner into the life of the lead
or supporting caregiver is a good example of how problems
would be analyzed differently under interdependency theory
than under the best interests test. A difficult case is the
example of In Kelly v. Kelly,4 in which the custodial parent
objected to her nine-year-old twin boys spending the night
with their father when their father's girlfriend also spent the
night. The mother framed her objections in terms of religious
dictates that extramarital sex was sinful, and she did not
want the boys to be exposed to sinful conduct.
The appellate court gave no weight to the religion
argument. According to the court, the best interests of the
children were served by allowing the father overnight
visitation in the presence of the girlfriend. The court
suggested that the mother and children see a therapist in
order to help the boys adjust to and tolerate their father's
decisions about his life. 42
The court's decision is fully consistent with dominant
social mores that adults should be allowed to live their own
lives and make whatever decisions are appropriate for them,
unless a particular decision is not in the best interests of the
child.43 Only a minority of modern family law commentators
40. See Vorderbrueggen v. Blakewell, 6 M.F.L.M. Supp. 37 (Md. Ct. Spec
App. April 28, 1998) (granting sole custody of child to father after mother had
continued to make baseless charges that father was abusing child).
41. 524 A.2d 1330 (1986).
42. Id. at 1335.
43. This understanding is reflected in statutes giving deference to parental
agreements that allow parents to make decisions on how they will live their
lives. See generally Dowd, supra note 33. The understanding is also reflected in
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and judges would argue that the court should require the
father to comply with the mother's moral judgments."" Under
interdependency theory, however, the focus shifts from the
relationship of the father and children to a focus on the
mother and children. In Kelly, the mother is the lead
caregiver and the person primarily responsible for the
children. She needs the support of the father, the supporting
caregiver, in order to raise her children as well as she can.
Interdependency theory dictates that the supporting
caregiver respect the lead caregiver's deeply held values.
Otherwise, the supporting caregiver could undermine the
children's trust in their mother's judgment, and it is their
mother on whom they rely each day.
Obviously, children in modern America are exposed to
multiple sets of values, both inside their homes and out.
Sometimes their parents do not share the same values. When
a person important to a young child requires the child to
reject or seriously question values important to the lead
caregiver, however, the young child may experience a loss of
trust in the lead caregiver. For that reason, it is important
that the supporting caregiver try to avoid putting a young
child in that kind of anxiety-ridden situation. In the Kelly
case, therefore, interdependency theory would instruct the
court to begin by examining the relationship between the
parents. The father wants to have a romantic relationship
and the mother wants the children to grow up regarding
extramarital sex as sinful. Both parents, as lead and
supporting caregivers, owe a duty of respect to each other.
Since the children are relatively young and live with the
person who finds the sexual relationship sinful, the first
question should be whether the father, out of respect for the
mother's values, could adjust his lifestyle so that his desire
for a romantic relationship does not involve the children. For
example, he might avoid having his girlfriend spend the night
when the children are present. He might consider marriage,
court decisions that have supported the right of homosexual parents to
maintain custody of their children. See, e.g., Fox v. Fox, 904 P.2d 66 (Okla.
1995) (denying father's modification request as he was unable to show that
mother's lesbianism was harmful to their children).
44. See Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce
and Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 503, 508-19 (discussing tendency of his
students not to hold anyone to anyone else's moral judgment except his or her
own, and how this reflects typical contemporary bourgeois morality).
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since the mother's objection was allegedly about his non-
marital sexual relationship, not about his possible
remarriage. The mother, however, also owes a duty of respect
to the father. Therefore, if he continues the non-marital
relationship, but conducts it out of sight of the children, she
needs to avoid condemning or even mentioning his conduct to
the children.
To some, this outcome may appear to be simply a new
rationale for justifying controlling behaviors by former
spouses or partners. Certainly, the theory produces that
result in some cases. Those cases should be uncommon,
however, because the focus is on mutual respect, not
unilateral control. For example, if Mrs. Kelly had never
expressed much interest in religion prior to Mr. Kelly's new
relationship, the court should be suspicious of her interest in
transmitting religiously based moral claims to the children.
The court is entitled to question whether the values she
expresses are deeply held and important to her. Similarly, if
Mrs. Kelly objected to Mr. Kelly's non-marital relationship
while at the same time engaged in such relationships herself,
a court could assume that her concern is about controlling
Mr. Kelly and has nothing to do with the children developing
a moral sensitivity consistent with her own.
By giving weight to the lead caregiver's moral values,
interdependency theory could open the door to a variety of
politically sensitive claims about parental behavior. For
example, if Mrs. Kelly's objection to Mr. Kelly's paramour is
that she is African-American, should the claim be allowed?
Assuming that such a claim is cognizable after Palmore v.
Sidoti,5 the question would be tested in the same way as any
other claim by a lead caregiver. That is, does the supporting
caregiver's conduct undermines the lead caregiver's ability to
share important and deeply held values with a young child?
In this situation, the lead caregiver's claim would fail. In a
culture that asserts race-neutrality as a fundamental and
45. Cf Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (holding that "the reality of
private biases and the possible injury they might inflict" are impermissible
considerations for change of custody) with A.L.I. Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.14 (Tentative Draft No. 3 1998)
(requiring courts to disregard race of parent, child or other family member
unless it pertains to parent's "ability to care for a child, including meeting a
child's need for a positive self-image").
1999] 983
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
.largely uncontested ideological stance, the lead caregiver's
ability to teach racial exclusiveness to a young child is
undermined at every turn; the supporting caregiver's race-
neutrality adds little to the children's reason to distrust the
lead caregiver on the question.
A more difficult question would arise if Mrs. Kelly
objected to Mr. Kelly's paramour because he is male.46
Disapproval of homosexuality remains an acceptable value in
many social, religious, and cultural settings, so young
children are not likely to be exposed to views contradicting
their mother's. The question then becomes whether Mrs.
Kelly's views about homosexuality constitute deeply held and
important values or simply opinions that she can keep to
herself without violating a sense of her own integrity. If they
are such important values, Mr. Kelly should be ordered not to
interfere with Mrs. Kelly's caregiving and not insist that Mrs.
Kelly and the children accept his relationship. For example,
overnight visitation in the presence of his paramour might be
prohibited. Mrs. Kelly cannot demand that Mr. Kelly stop
seeing his paramour or that the paramour not be present
when the children are with Mr. Kelly. Further, any
constraints that a court might impose must end when the
children enter adolescence, an age when they begin to assert
their own values.
In addition to mutual respectfulness, both the lead
caregiver and the supporting caregiver have duties toward
each other and the child in regard to reliability. It is
particularly important for young children that people are
reliable, although even for older children, unreliability is
distressing.47 When a supporting caregiver is responsible for
the physical or financial care of a child, he or she must be
reliable in carrying out those responsibilities. A child notices
when someone important fails to show up at an appointed
46. There are challenges to the custodial and visitation rights of parents
who are in relationships with same sex partners. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This
Child Does have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Non-Traditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J.
459 (1990).
47. Both of my children can clearly recall the one or two occasions when
their father or I failed to collect them on time from school or failed to be at an
appointed spot to meet them after a meeting or event. However, neither child
can recall with similar clarity all other occasions when their father or I were at
the right spot on time.
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time, and the child's disappointment is a harm directly
inflicted by an unreliable supporting caregiver. Failures not
personally experienced by the child also have an impact,
because the lead caregiver learns from those failures that he
or she cannot be secure about receiving promised support.
Reliability is also an essential part of the lead caregiver's
role because it demonstrates that the lead caregiver values
the help of the supporting caregiver. Thus, for example, the
lead caregiver has the duty of making sure that the child is
ready for a visit with the supporting caregiver whenever one
is scheduled.
E. Who Qualifies as a Lead or Supporting Caregiver?
Family law in the United States identifies biological or
legal parents as the people usually entitled to exercise legal
authority in regard to a child.48 Interdependency theory, on
the other hand, identifies caregivers with less regard to their
biological or legal parenthood. Instead, what counts is the
caregiver's commitment to the child, coupled with reliable
and respectful performance of caregiving for the child.49
While privileging function over status may appear to be a
threat to those parents, interdependency theory is a threat
only to legal or biological parents who fail to meet their
responsibilities as parents. °  Since legal and biological
48. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(denying opportunity to establish paternity to child's biological father, based
upon legal presumption that man married to biological mother at time of
conception is the child's father). "[Olur traditions have protected the marital
family.., against [intrusion from third parties].") Id. at 124. See also
SCHNEIDER & BRINING, supra note 21, at 688-89 ("It is standard American law
that in a custody dispute between natural parents and 'strangers,' that natural
parents are to be accorded special status"); JOHN F. FADER II & RICHARD J.
GILBERT, MARYLAND FAMILY LAw 208 (2d ed. 1995); LESLIE E. HARRIS ET AL.,
FAMILY LAW 1081 (1986); WALTER 0. WEYRAUCH ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON FAMILY LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND CHANGING HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 670-
71, 841 (1994); Naomi R. Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 14-18 (1997).
49. Professor Naomi Cahn prefers a similar but more inclusive test for who
should be recognized as parents: those who have declared a willingness to
assume responsibility for the child, and have a legal connection based either on
biology or already having cared for the child for a significant period of time.
Cahn, supra note 48, at 48-53.
50. I do not mean to underplay or ignore the reality that racism and sexism
in law and society means that children have been, and continue to be, removed
from caring and competent parents after being unjustly accused of neglect or
abuse. See, e.g., PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES, THE
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parents typically satisfy the mandates of interdependency
theory, most current visitation orders would stay the same.
What interdependency theory adds is a reason to sustain the
rights and responsibilities that legal and biological parents
ordinarily enjoy. It rewards people who express a
commitment to children in a way that present law cannot,
since present law so often privileges people based on status
rather than on performance.
Because it privileges function over status,
interdependency theory supports some results in visitation
disputes that differ from current law. First, it does not
matter if the person seeking time with a child is a parent.
Any formerly co-resident adult may qualify, so long as the
person qualifies as a supporting caregiver. In other words,
post-separation contact with a child depends on pre-
separation behavior, not legal status. Parents and non-
parents who behave the same are treated the same. At the
same time, post-separation contact with a child is not
available to a formerly co-resident adult-whether a parent
or not-who did not perform as a supportive caregiver prior to
separation.
There are many justifications for the differences. First,
many children live in functional families that contain, at
most, one biological or legal parent.5' Where another adult is
CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 142-55 (1997) (noting long history of
prejudicial assumptions of whites concerning abilities of African-Americans to
parent); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitionsfrom Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688,
702-13 (1998). My argument assumes, however, that those systems have begun
to respond to their critics. Even in the many places where reform has not
occurred, interdependency theory should be preferable to the less determinate
tests now used in neglect and abuse cases because it requires that potential
interventions be tested by whether they support the caregiver's ability to do the
best he or she can for the child. The most influential voice in this assessment
should be the mothers, not the voice of the expert who "knows better" than the
mother what she needs for the child. See DONNA L. FRANKLIN, ENSURING
INEQUALITY: THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN
FAMILY (1997) (discussing new social work practice paradigm where the social
worker helps the mother clean the home rather than removing children from
the dirty home); Ann Shalleck, Child Custody and Child Neglect: Parenthood in
Legal Practice and Culture, in MOTHERS IN LAW 309-325 (Fineman and Karpin,
eds. 1995) (discussing difficulty of persuading court to attend to mother's desire
to transfer guardianship of children to grandmother once mother found
neglectful).
51. Of children born in 1992, more than half are likely to spend some or all
of their childhood living separately from one of their parents. SARA
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present, that person has no legal or biological ties to the child.
To a young child, the difference between the two adults need
not be vital; what is vital for the child is to have someone to
rely on. When an adult makes a commitment to a child,
reliably performs caregiving functions and works respectfully
with other caregiving adults, the child benefits. Further,
from the child's perspective, losing contact with the
supporting caregiver after separation can cause suffering,
whether or not the adult is a parent.
Second, interdependency theory seeks to reward people
who help young children thrive. It does so through paying
attention to the needs of people who care for young children.
When a caregiver with a child decides to take up residence
with a third person, she presumably sees the situation as one
that not only serves her own interests but which also aids her
in helping her child. Presumably, the third person
understands that the shared residence will contain a child
along with the caregiver. By agreeing to share the residence,
the third person agrees to help the caregiver, at least by
tolerating the presence of a child, and at most by contributing
emotional involvement, money, and time. As the caregiver
benefits from the shared residence, so does the child. The
third party providing the support should have some
expectation that the sacrifices will not go unnoticed. A legally
enforceable promise of continuing access to the child in the
event of a separation recognizes the reasonableness of that
expectation.
Privileging claims of parental access over claims of non-
parental access is commonly accepted in the United States."
The presumption is that a child's legal or biological parents
care more about the child than anyone else.5" Sub silentio,
MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT
HURTS, WHAT HELPS 2-3 (1994).
52. Courts typically favor parents over third parties in claims for custody
unless the parents are unable or unfit to care for the child. See supra note 47;
Schuh v. Robertson, 788 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Ark. 1990) (holding that a third party
must show that "the parent is not a suitable person to have the child" in order
to deny that parent custody); Petersen v. Rogers, 445 S.E.2d 901, 902 (N.C.
1994) (holding that parents have constitutional right to custody of children
barring unrelated third parties from bringing claims for custody); McDonald v.
Wrigley, 870 P.2d 777, 779 (Okla. 1994) (holding that a third party must show
that a parent is unfit in order to successfully bring custody claim).
53. See SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 21, at 596 n.24 ("Parents are
simply presumed to act in their children's best interest.., and are given almost
9871999]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
privileging parental entitlement is also grounded in the quid
pro quo idea that a person who bears a financial
responsibility for a child should have a reciprocal right of
access. 64  Parental caregiving, however, is simply not the
reality for many children. Nearly three million children live
in homes with no parents," and many more live in homes
where one parent is present and the other has not been seen
or heard from in years.56 Privileging uncommitted and non-
participating parents over committed and participating non-
parents makes no sense for children in these circumstances.
Non-parental claims for access to the child are likely to
come from four sources: 1) non-marital partners, including
same sex couples who have intentionally created a parent-
child relationship together and then separate; 2)
grandparents; 3) former lovers of a single parent; and 4)
babysitters. Each situation raises somewhat different but
interrelated issues.
The simplest situation involves the nonmarital couple
who intentionally creates a parent-child relationship
together. Often, these couples are legally prevented from
marrying because they are the same sex. If permitted to
plenary authority in interactions with the outside world.").
54. See Karen Czapanskiy, Child Support and Visitation: Rethinking the
Connections, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 619, 650 (1989) ("[Tlhe central metaphor is that
contact with a child is a commodity to be bought and sold.").
55. The Department of Commerce found that, in 1995, 70,254,000 children
were under the age of eighteen. Four percent of these children (approximately
2.8 million) did not live with either parent. U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 65 (1996).
56. See Czapanskiy, supra note 54, at 637 (nearly half of children in
national sample had not seen the nonresidential parent during prior five years).
57. See Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (West Supp. 1998):
No state, territory or possession of the United States, or Indian Tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record or judicial
proceeding of any other state, territory or possession of the United
States, or Indian Tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
state, territory or possession of the United States, or Indian Tribe, or a
right or claim arising from such relationship.
Id. See also 1 U.S.C. § 7 (West 1997) (definition of 'marriage' and 'spouse'). But
see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993) (challenge to Hawaii's
statutory prohibition against same-sex marriage; court held statute was
presumptively unconstitutional because it created a sex-based classification,
and remanded; "Marriage is a state-conferred legal status, the existence of
which gives rise to rights and benefits reserved exclusively to that particular
relationship"); Baehr v. Miike, 23 FAM. L. REP. 2001 (Haw. Cir. Ct., Dec. 10,
1996) (upon remand, holding statute unconstitutional; "if same-sex marriage is
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marry, each would have the same legal relationship to the
child.58 Post-separation access would be presumed, as it is for
divorced parents. 9  Because they are prohibited from
marrying, however, only the one who bore or adopted the
child is a legal parent with an enforceable right of access. °
Interdependency theory supports according both former
partners appropriate rights of access6 if each qualifies as a
lead or supporting caregiver. By creating the parent-child
relationship together, each member of the couple expresses a
commitment to the child. Assuming that the commitment did
not change during the relationship, and that each partner
reliably performed caregiving functions and treated the other
allowed, the children being raised by gay or lesbian parents and same-sex
couples may be assisted, because they may obtain certain protections and
benefits that come with or become available as a result of a marriage").
Some affected couples would be people of different sexes who do not marry
because of personal preferences or because of prohibitions on their marriage
such as bigamy or incest. If both are the biological parents of the child,
however, modern family law would find each to be a legal parent with custody
and access rights like those of a married couple, so their situation need not be
considered one of access by a nonmarital partner.
58. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
112-14 (1996) (examining the emotional and legal impact of restrictions on gay
families with children); David L. Chambers, What If?: The Legal Consequences
of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 447, 461-71 (1996) (evaluating legal problems surrounding stepparent,
surrogacy and adoption modes of parenting for lesbians and gay men as
compared with married heterosexuals).
59. Cf Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990) (holding former lesbian
lover lacks standing to seek visitation order because she is not child's parent)
and Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (reaching same
conclusion) with Frail v. Frail, 370 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (holding
divorced mother in prison for murder had right to visitation with children) and
Arnold v. Naughton, 486 A.2d 1204 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (holding father
entitled to visitation despite clear and convincing evidence that he had abused
children).
60. See In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995); In re Adoption of Tammy,
619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993); In re Adoption of Adam, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835 (App.
Div. 1994); In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993). But see, In re
Angel Lace M., N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994). See also Orlando Patterson, Adoption
of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Sociological Perspective, 2
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 191 (1995).
61. That is, the same approximation rule would apply to them as would
apply to formerly married parents whose conduct qualifies each to some
authority in regard to the child. Many states already recognize some visitation
rights for people who have acted like parents. See John DeWitt Gregory, Blood
Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 351 (1998).
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respectfully, there is no reason to deny either one the
applicable degree of responsibility for, and authority over, the
child after a separation.
Interdependency theory comes to the same result with
respect to post-separation access by co-resident adults other
than the partner of a caregiver. As Martha Fineman has
forcefully argued, supporting caregivers are often drawn from
the ranks of adults who have a relationship to the caregiver
based in something other than a sexual relationship.62 An
ever-increasing number of the grandparents of young children
act as supporting and even lead caregivers.63 Ensuring them
a continuing role in the grandchild's life after the need for a
three-generation household has passed is a way of
encouraging and rewarding the altruism that caregivers and
their children need when they are in crisis.64  Three-
generation households are not without danger for some
children, since a caregiver can become too dependent on his or
her parents." But for most, having a place of refuge is
critical, and interdependency theory recognizes its
importance to the child.
It is also possible that interdependency theory would
produce a poor result for a child whose caregiver cohabitates
with a heterosexual partner, and the relationship lasts long
enough to give the partner an opportunity to establish him or
herself as a supporting caregiver. After the household breaks
62. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 85 (1995). See also
Nadine F. Marks & Sara S. McLanahan, Gender, Family Structure, and Social
Support Among Parents, 55 J. MARR. & THE FAM. 481, 492 (1995) ("[lIt appears
that friends, not other kin, are the most significant members of the social
support networks of nontraditional families. Both mothers and fathers (with
the interesting exception of stepmoms) in nontraditional families, if anything,
have higher probabilities of social support relationships with friends than
traditional family parents.") (emphasis added).
63. Mary C. Rudasill, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren: Problems and
Policy from an Illinois Perspective, 3 ELDER L.J. 215, 216 (1995) (finding that
551,000 grandparents, ages 45 and up, in 353,000 households have
grandchildren with no parents present).
64. See Czapanskiy, supra note 22.
65. In her study of poor African-American families, Donna Franklin
suggests that three generation households, especially those in which a single
grandmother and single mother are relatively close in age, may cause role
conflicts. Such conflict may cause stress, anxiety, and depression in the mother,
which could lead to inconsistent parenting and ultimately developmental
problems. FRANKLIN, supra note 50, at 199-01, 226-27; see also FRANK F.
FURSTENBURG, ET AL., ADOLESCENT MOTHERS IN LATER LIFE 126, 136 (1987).
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up, the approximation rule would require that the lead
caregiver permit the former partner some role in the child's
life unless the former partner never became a supporting
caregiver. For example, if the former partner never
performed any caregiving tasks, shared few financial
resources with the lead caregiver, or resorted to violence, a
court should find that the partner is not a supporting
caregiver."6 Allowing the former co-resident access to court to
argue for rights, however, creates a problem for the lead
caregiver and child even when the former co-resident loses.
The judicial process increases the insecurity of the caregiver
and child, reduces the household's financial resources, and
opens the door to a settlement under which the child may end
up spending time with a person who did not care enough
while living with the child to behave as a supporting
caregiver.6"
One solution to the problem is to deny supporting
caregiver status to all non-marital co-residents of caregivers
and children. This solution, however, undercuts the point of
interdependency theory that the law should make it
attractive for adults to support caregivers. Equally
important, this solution suggests that marital co-residents
should be treated more favorably than non-marital co-
residents regardless of conduct as caregivers. Since
interdependency theory seeks to enlarge incentives for adults
to take care of children, privileging marital partners who do
no caregiving work is unacceptable. Similarly, distinguishing
among non-marital co-residents would give people in some
status groups greater rights to supporting caregiver status
than others solely because of their status and not because of
their conduct. While this might be appealing politically, it is
hard to see how it improves the lives of young children who
are dependent on caregivers. For example, it might be
attractive to give grandmothers or stepfathers more rights
than same-sex partners, but the caregiver and child receive
66. Even though a new relationship holds the potential of improving the
caregiver and child's financial and emotional situations, the result is not
guaranteed. See AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 15, at 159-60.
67. Telephone interview with Sally Goldfarb (July 23, 1998) (arguing that
visitation rights should be awarded to a parent's cohabitant only if the parent
affirmatively agreed to consider the cohabitant as a co-parent); see Cahn, supra
note 48, at 54-55.
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no greater benefit in the arrangement. Further, the lead
caregiver in the same-sex relationship does not, simply
because of the status of the partner, have a greater claim to a
larger degree of post-separation autonomy than the lead
caregiver who has relied on a grandmother or a husband for
support. Indeed, if the same-sex partners undertook the
decision to raise a child together, their intentions probably
included some form of relatedness, at least during the child's
minority.68 The supporting grandmother or husband probably
entered into no similar explicit agreement with the caregiver
before the child was born.
It would be a rare event under interdependency theory
for a paid babysitter to qualify as a caregiver or supporting
caregiver, but the possibility should not be ruled out. The
situation would be rare because few babysitters live with
their charges long enough for the relationship to ripen into a
caregiving or even supporting caregiving claim.69 Where a
young child is left with a babysitter for long periods of time,
however, a supporting caregiver relationship might result,
because the babysitter might become committed to the child
and perform most of the caregiving work which the child
needs. The child is likely to begin looking at the babysitter
as, at least, a supporting caregiver. Simply receiving
payment to care for a child is no incentive for most people to
undertake this kind of commitment to a child. A paid
babysitter who does so is probably a very special person for
the child in any event. Giving the lead caregiver full
authority to deny the babysitter access to the child in these
rare circumstances would not be in accord with
interdependency theory, because the lead caregiver allowed
the relationship to develop, presumably in full knowledge
that the child was growing increasingly close to the
babysitter. ° If a visiting relationship is established and the
68. See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:
Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and
other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 533-36 (1990).
69. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172 (1977) (awarding custody to babysitter
when biological mother attempted to regain custody after eight years).
70. A more complex but not unrelated form of this problem may arise when
a foster parent develops a long-term and strong relationship with the child in
his or her care, and then the child's legal parent regains custody. The
possibility that the foster parent could be a supporting caregiver cannot be
ruled out, but it would be rare, given the characteristics of most foster care
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lead caregiver finds that the former babysitter fails to support
her as the lead caregiver, the caregiver can move to end the
relationship.
III. How DOES INTERDEPENDENCY THEORY COMPARE WITH
OTHER FAMILY LAW THEORIES?
In the context of family law, interdependency theory
should be viewed as an attack on the best interests test.
Although the best interests test is stated in a variety of ways,
a common element is the claim that a court acts out of its
parens patriae power with regard to the child alone.7 The
test requires that the court examine the life of a child without
regard for any caregivers who are committed to and
responsible for the child's care and on whom the child
depends. Interdependency theory, in contrast, requires that
courts examine the life of a young child as the child
experiences it, that is, through the relationship of the child to
the child's caregiver(s). The presumption under
interdependency theory is that no court knows as much about
a child's best interests as the child's caregiver(s). Therefore,
the court should defer to the caregiver(s)'s assessment.
Where possible, the court should also help the child by
helping the lead caregiver gather resources needed to do the
best he or she can for the child.
Interdependency theory resonates with aspects of what
"protectionists" say about family law while not ignoring
insights of "interventionists." Doctors Joseph Goldstein,
Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit, and Professors Martha
Fineman, Nancy Polikoff, and Barbara Woodhouse, in
somewhat different ways, have been noted advocates for
protectionist perspectives. Professors Cornel West and Sylvia
arrangements. The child's legal parent may have placed the child in the state's
care voluntarily, but more likely the placement was involuntary from the
parent's perspective. Further, the state, rather than the caregiver, selects the
foster parent. The state would be involved in any visitation that might occur,
which could cause bureaucratic difficulties. Finally, the caregiver might view
the former foster parent as a threat to his or her own parenting, especially if the
state is involved in setting up the visitation. See David Finkel, Now Say
Goodbye to Diane, WASH. POST MAG., May 4, 1997, at 8.
71. See, e.g., Seymour v. Seymour, 433 A.2d 1005 (Conn. 1980); Pikula v.
Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985); Rhodes v. Rhodes, 449 S.E.2d 75 (W.Va.
1994); Brown v. Brown, 403 S.E.2d 29 (W. Va. 1991); Graham v. Graham, 326
S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1984); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
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Hewlett and author David Blankenhorn have been among the
most articulate proponents of the interventionist approaches.
In the following section, interdependency theory is examined
in light of their ideas.
Requiring courts to defer to the caregiver was proposed
over twenty-five years ago in a book by Doctors Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child."2
While similar in many respects, interdependency theory
differs markedly from the view asserted by Goldstein, Freud,
and Solnit. Their view of the child's life is limited to the
child's immediate household, usually made up of the child
and one or two parents. Their view is entirely correct in the
sense that the child, particularly a young child, is likely to see
the world almost entirely through the lenses of the parents or
caregiver on whom the child is directly dependent."
A problem with the view of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit,
however, is that no child's life is as narrowly constrained as
they describe. Although the child may be unaware of it,
parents and caregivers constantly interact with other people
and institutions for the benefit of the child. Without these
interactions, parents or caregivers cannot garner the
resources necessary to provide for the child's needs.74
For example, parents cannot fulfill their financial
responsibility for a child without money. Usually, earning
money is not seen by young children directly, but it is vital if
the child is to eat, have shelter and wear clothing. In some
72. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
37-38 (1973).
73. But see KAGAN, supra note 28; HARRIS, supra note 28.
Infants have individual personality traits which form the child's
temperament. The temperament shapes how an individual reacts to
his surrounding environment. If the relationship between the
environment and the individual's temperament is discordant,
behavioral problems will insue. Certain types of temperaments, may
however, allow a child to develop in a healthy manner despite severe
disturbances in the child's environment.
STELLA CHESS & ALEXANDER THOMAS, TEMPERAMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE
2-17 (1996).
74. Cf. David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody
Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984) (arguing that empirical
evidence that child should always be placed with primary caregiver insufficient,
though clinical observations suggest it is apt for children under 5 years old);
Peggy C. Davis, The Good Mother: A New Look at Psychological Parent Theory,
22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 347 (1996) (children thrive with a familiar
"milieu and a network of attachments").
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families, parents specialize. One parent provides more
caregiving and becomes the child's psychological parent,
while the other parent provides more of the household's
economic sustenance. Under the family law policies
advocated by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, if the parents
separate, the parent who specialized in economic production
would have no right of access to the child. 5  Under
interdependency theory, on the other hand, the parent who
specialized in caregiving would be the lead caregiver and the
other parent would be the supporting caregiver. Both must
perform their roles for the child's life to remain secure.
When considered solely in terms of the psychological
parent theory propounded by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit,
shared authority between lead and supporting caregivers
cannot be justified. Instead, it must be justified on the basis
that the child's attachment to a lead caregiver is only one
part of a scenario that serves a child's needs. The scenario is
incomplete unless one also looks at the support that the lead
caregiver receives and depends on. Parents who provide some
caregiving but spend most of their time engaged in economic
activity must be recognized for the support they provide to
the child through their support of the lead caregiver. Their
"reward" is the opportunity to have an ongoing relationship
with the child that the lead caregiver cannot control or
eliminate.
Professor Fineman argues that the exclusive family unit
that should be recognized in law is the "mother/child dyad," a
metaphorical term that includes the caregiver and any
dependent person, whether that person is a child or an adult
who is ill, disabled, frail, or elderly."6 In her view, dependency
is inevitable, universal, and inherent in the human condition
in that everyone at some point in life is dependent on
someone else's care." The most obvious examples are infants
and young children who depend on caregivers for survival."8
It is also inevitable, Fineman asserts, that caregivers cannot
perform their caregiving work without the assistance of
others, which she calls derivative dependency. 9 According to
75. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 72, at 38.
76. FINEMAN, supra note 62, at 230-31.
77. Id. at 162.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 163.
1999] 995
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Fineman, derivative dependency could be constructed in a
variety of ways. But in this culture, Fineman argues, it is the
private, uncompensated, and hidden responsibility of
women.80  She concludes that society should compensate
caregivers, rather than hide their work and penalize them for
performing it.8
Up to this point, Fineman and I are in agreement. Her
diagnosis of the processes that create derivative dependency
and the ways in which caregivers are ignored and devalued is
entirely accurate. Clearly, as Fineman demonstrates, caring
for children requires commitment and performance, and no
caregiver can perform to the best of his or her abilities
without the assistance of other adults and institutions. I fully
agree with Fineman that dependent children cannot thrive
when their caregivers are suffering from isolation, poverty,
and deprivation. To care for the children, one must care for
the caregivers. We differ on several points about how to cure
the problems created by inevitable dependency.
First, Fineman argues that the only "family unit" that
should be validated in law is the mother/child dyad. Even
though she identifies the term as a metaphor that need not be
gender-specific or adult/child specific, the idea remains
unpersuasive. One of the problems faced by many derivative
dependents is that they live in single-parent families, a
family structure condemned in both law and culture, while
the married two-parent family structure is valorized and
rewarded. Making the mother/child dyad the only legally
recognized family form reinforces the notion that some family
structures are inevitably better and worthier than others are.
Family structure alone, however, does not determine whether
dependents are cared for or whether their caregivers enjoy
the support they require. At least as important to both
dependents and their caregivers are their relationships with
each other and with other individuals and institutions outside
of the immediate relationship. People structure these
relationships in an immense variety of ways, determined in
part by the ages of the people involved, their cultural
heritage, race, gender, geographic locations, and historical
context. When the law prefers one structure over another,
80. Id. at 162-63.
81. Id. at 165-66.
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even a structure as deserving of priority as the mother/child
dyad, other structures that perform just as well or better are
devalued by many who might otherwise use them for their
own and society's benefit.
A more complicated issue is Fineman's views on the right
of access to a child. She and I agree that access law has
enlarged the rights of people who have demonstrated no
responsibility for the children they now have rights to see.
Expansion of rights has been based largely on one's status as
a legal or biological father, rather than on one's conduct. We
also agree that the impulse behind expanding access rights
has more to do with controlling the conduct of mothers than
with improving the well being of children.
Where we part company is on the test for allowing access.
Professor Fineman would permit access where the father has
been a mother "in the stereotypical nurturing sense of that
term, that is, engaged in caretaking."82 In contrast, I argue
that a supporting caregiver achieves that status and the
concomitant right to access through a combination of
behaviors, only some of which involve directly caring for the
child (stereotypical mothering, in Fineman's terms). The
other qualifying behaviors include supporting the lead
caregiver financially, physically, and emotionally-behaviors
the child does not experience directly. I come to this
conclusion because I think that caregivers both need and
value the support they receive. What they lack is tools to get
support. Denying the right of access to people who have
never nurtured the child, as Fineman prescribes, is a good
and necessary first step, because it relieves caregivers of the
fear that they must share a child with someone who has
never proven himself to be a capable and reliable nurturer.
But it does not go far enough, because it defines for caregivers
the nature of the support they can demand--only that which
nurtures the child directly. Caregivers may also want
indirect support, whether financial, some time off, or a second
person at school for a parent-teacher conference. Caregivers
need the law to help them when they seek support of all
kinds, just as they need to have options for structuring their
own caregiving, consistent with their unique abilities and
their specific needs in regard to the particular child.
82. FINEMAN, supra note 62, at 234-35.
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Interdependency theory, therefore, tests the legitimacy of
a legal intervention by asking whether the proposed
intervention supports the caregiver in doing the best job he or
she can. Access is available for those with a history of
reliable, respectful support for the caregiver as a way of
encouraging people to choose to help caregivers. Promising
the reward of a continuing relationship with a child is a
critical element of that encouragement. Fineman would
argue that according such rights to supporting caregivers who
do little nurturing is impossible because courts would use the
opening to re-impose on women the patriarchal powers that
men currently enjoy.8" In other words, the best protection
from patriarchy is insulation of the mother/child dyad from
judicial intervention, except where the child, in effect, has
two mothers.
Fineman's critique is serious. Multiple and repeated
studies of different state courts demonstrate that women and
men receive different treatment in the judicial system and
that women's caregiving is systematically devalued.84 It is
possible, therefore, that interdependency theory would, in
operation, be less desirable than a more complete bar to
intervention. It is fair to say, however, that many women
who raise children with partners and many women who raise
children alone, value connections with people who help them
care for the children. They see their participation in such
communities as a positive aspect of their lives as well as a
potentially threatening one.85 Such women would understand
that the willingness of any individual to participate in
83. Id. at 83, 212-13, 223.
84. In a study of custody cases, Professor Mary Becker concluded thatjudges were biased against women when they were sexually active, forced to
work, earning a lower income than the father, homosexual, involved in an
interracial marriage, or were single when the father was remarried. By
focusing on these characteristics, judges have ignored the mother's abilities as a
caregiver and as a result, have devalued that role. See Mary Becker, Maternal
Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 REV. OF L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133,
175 (1992).
85. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81,
140-41 (1987) (stating that women depend heavily on relationships with others
in raising their children; "we live in an interdependent and hierarchical natural
web with others of varying degrees of strength"); cf GEOFFREY L. GREIF, THE
DADDY TRACK AND THE SINGLE FATHER 214 (1990) (stating that single fathers
often feel they should not ask for help from others).
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caregiving might well depend on the opportunities to
maintain relationships with children they help care for.
Interdependency theory seeks to give voice to the positive
experiences of caregivers who share in the care of children,
while preventing threats of judicial intervention that
undermine and threaten their capacity to care for children. It
is a delicate balance, but one worth seeking.86
A protectionist who differs from Professor Fineman is
Professor Nancy Polikoff, who argues that when a man and a
woman agree that the woman should be the sole legal parent
of their biological child, that agreement should be honored in
court and the man's paternal rights terminated.87  She
explores her idea by comparing two cases in which the
biological mother conceived through sperm donated by a man
who agreed to forego parental rights. Subsequent to the birth
86. Like Fineman, interdependency theory can be criticized for confining
women to the role of caregiver to the detriment of all women, whether or not
caregivers. Several replies are possible. First, Fineman is right when she
argues that ignoring women's caregiving work has not benefitted women unless
they occupy the small category of women who do no caregiving. The problem, it
seems to me, is not whether to valorize caregiving, but whether to confound
womanhood with caregiving. Interdependency theory avoids this by identifying
caregivers by function rather than biology.
If acceptable caregiving under the theory includes only those practices
associated with certain kinds of parenting, however, it is still subject to the
criticism that the categories of woman and caregiver are so overlapping as to be
identical, to the detriment of those in either category who are not both. That is,
if one must be a stay-at-home mom in order to qualify as a caregiver, then
working moms and dads must, upon birth of a child, either give up the job or
give up the parenthood.
Acceptable caregiving, under the theory, is not limited to that kind of
parental time commitment. What it requires and privileges is responsibility for
responsiveness to children. What constitutes responsiveness to children is,
beyond certain minimums, a socially-constructed concept. While every baby
needs nourishment, not every nine-year-old needs a parent on the sidelines of
every soccer game. Interdependency theory avoids essentializing children as
needing extensive care for many years. It is limited to the times when children
are developmentally incapable of self-care and need a caregiver to provide
essential nourishment or to intermediate between the child and the larger
society outside the family. Further, interdependency theory does not privilege
one kind of parenthood over another, so long as minimally acceptable parenting
is performed. Beyond that minimum, caregivers are free to identify for
themselves appropriate parenting'practices. The role of the law is to protect
their autonomy in regard to their selected practices rather than to select their
practices.
87. Nancy D. Polikoff, The Deliberate Construction of Families without Fa-
thers: Is it an Option for Lesbian and Heterosexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 375 (1996).
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of the child, and with the mother's consent, the biological
father developed a relationship with the child. In each case,
the biological father began to act contrary to the wishes of the
biological mother in terms of how he should behave toward
the child, and the biological mother terminated visitation. In
both cases, the biological fathers sued for an order of
paternity and to establish visitation rights. In Thomas S. v.
Robin Y,88 the New York trial court ruled against the father
and was reversed on appeal, while in Leckie v. Voorhies,89 the
trial court ruled against the father and was sustained on
appeal.
Polikoff argues that the Leckie court's approval of private
ordering of parental relationships is the preferable route
when the goal is to create and sustain stable and secure
families for children. ° An even more desirable legal option,
she argues, would be the routine acceptance of single-parent
adoption in situations where one parent is prepared to be the
exclusive parent and the other biological parent approves."
Like Fineman, Polikoff argues that women must be free to
raise children without the control of a man. She argues that
opposition to mother-headed families has little to do with the
emotional well being of a child in a secure parent-child
relationship. Instead, opposition is based in the proposition
that children's economic support must be found within the
private resources of their biological progenitors. In other
words, once a child has an identified father, society can be
assured that the child will be taken care of. The existence of
the father eliminates the need to acknowledge even a partial
public responsibility toward the child. If single motherhood
were honored, society would also have to acknowledge the
limitations of private financial support for children, rather
than simply blame the fathers and mothers who fail to
provide it."
Polikoffs argument that mothers should be allowed to
become the exclusive legal parents of their children is well-
placed in situations where the mother is the lead caregiver
and any supporting caregivers have abandoned their roles.
88. 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993).
89. 875 P.2d 521 (Or. App. 1994).
90. POLIKOFF, supra note 87, at 393.
91. Id. at 389.
92. Id. at 375-78.
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Unfortunately, her carefully crafted solution does not go that
far. It is limited to situations where both biological parents
explicitly agree to the arrangement.93 It does not address the
situation where, early in the child's life, both the mother and
father would happily acknowledge exclusive parenthood in
the mother and both behave consistently with that desire, but
the father changes his mind before an explicit agreement has
been entered into. Polikoff argues against permitting an
exclusive parenthood order to be entered on the basis of an
implied contract, because she fears privileging the common
and irresponsible behavior of a biological father who, acting
alone or without the freely-given consent of his sexual
partner, wants to legally avoid parental responsibilities.94
Although Polikoff does not say so, her limitation on the
availability of exclusive parenthood to those with an express
contract is also consistent with an individualist perspective.
That is, it favors those who act with intention to take
advantage of contractual opportunities. It disfavors those
who fail to protect their interests by negotiating an express
contract. Consistent with the individualist perspective,
Polikoff argues that the principal benefit of recognizing the
express contract for exclusive parenthood is that individual
women will have the freedom to create the family structure
they wish.95
Under interdependency theory, both implied and express
contracts for exclusive parenthood would be recognized.
Polikoffs point that mothers should have the freedom to
create their own family structures is important, but not solely
to satisfy individual needs. For the purposes of
interdependency theory, her freedom is important because it
enhances her capacity to be the best caregiver she can.
Freedom provides the lead caregiver with the security of
knowing that nobody has the right to disrupt the household
she has organized and that she need not defend her
household arrangements in court. In other words, the
rationale is not based solely on the woman's claim for
autonomy separate from her parenthood.
Equally important, both sorts of contracts for exclusive
93. Id. at 393.
94. Id. at 376.
95. Id. at 377-78, 393-94.
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parenthood give the lead caregiver freedom to enter into a
relationship with a new supporting caregiver. Without a
contract, she faces the risk of multiple court orders requiring
her to share time with, and authority over, the child with
several people. In addition, unless she can exclude prior
claimants for parenthood, she cannot create in the supporting
caregiver the authority that person may need to exercise on
behalf of the child.
The importance of recognizing implied as well as express
contracts cannot be overstated. First, most parents do not
enter into the types of explicit contracts present in Thomas S.
and Leckie. Second, the implied contract scenario is common
in communities affected by HIV and AIDS. Both the values
and the practices of these communities need to be validated
in law.96 In many of the families I have represented, the
single father or mother acted as the lead caregiver until he or
she became too ill. Frequently, the other biological parent
was never a supporting caregiver. Indeed, in some cases, the
other biological parent had little acquaintance with the child.
Someone else came to be the parent's supporting caregiver.
This was the parent's mother, sister, husband, boyfriend, or a
close friend. Both the parent and the supporting caregiver
want the child to remain with the supporting caregiver after
the parent's death, but the continuing parental rights of the
other biological parent poses a substantial barrier to
accomplish this legitimate goal in any reliable and
predictable way. 7 The only solution is eliminating the
parental rights of the absent parent and placing exclusive
parental rights in the caregiving parent. The exclusive
parent can then decide whether to designate the supporting
caregiver as the child's guardian after the caregiver's death
or, as happens in some cases, to consent to the adoption of the
96. See Twila L. Perry, Family Values, Race, Feminism and Public Policy,
36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345, 370-71 (1996); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Toward a Communitarian Theory of the "Nontraditional" Family, 1996 UTAH L.
REV. 569, 582-84.
97. See Joyce McConnell, Standby Guardianship: Sharing the Legal
Responsibility for Children, 7 MD. J. CONT. L. ISSUES 249, 265-66 (1995); Susan
L. Waysdorf, Families in the AIDS Crisis: Access, Equality, Empowerment, and
the Role of Kinship Caregivers, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 145, 183-86 (1994); Ann
Shalleck, Child Custody and Child Neglect: Parenthood in Legal Practice and
Culture, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION
OF MOTHERHOOD 321-24 (Fineman & Karpin, eds. 1996).
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child by the supporting caregiver before the parent's death.
The right of the absent biological parent to second-guess the
decision and to embroil the family in a judicial dispute is
eliminated totally.98
A difficulty with recognizing implied contracts is exactly
the problem identified by Polikoff.99 Since many biological
fathers behave as if they have no responsibilities toward their
biological children, and since the absence of public funding
leaves many children financially dependent on biological
fathers, recognizing implied contracts that free biological
fathers from fatherhood based on their abandoning behaviors
could put even more children at economic risk. This would
happen, for example, if a biological father fails to support the
mother physically, emotionally, or financially for a year after
the baby is born and then demands visitation. When the
mother denies visitation and is upheld by a court, the father
could, under an implied contract of exclusive parenthood
theory, demand that he be relieved of all parental
responsibility for support of the child he is not allowed to
visit. Despite the mother's denial that she is interested in
98. In one case I was involved in, the mother had a child ("A") with a man
who rarely contacted her after the child was born and who paid support only
when forced to by the child support collection authorities. His paternity was
established because the mother was required to cooperate in paternity
establishment and assign her rights to child support when she applied for
AFDC. MD. CODE ANN., Art. 88A, § 50(b)(2) (Supp. 1997). When the child was
an infant, the mother began a relationship with another man, who behaved as a
father to "A" as well as to the children that he had subsequently with the
mother. The mother and he married shortly before she died. Before she died,
she named her husband as A's guardian and expressed her desire that he adopt
A, which he wanted to do. Adoption was needed because, if A's biological father
ever reappeared, he would have a superior right to A's custody. MD. CODE ANN.
FAM. LAW § 5-203 (1991). Although A's biological father could not be found, it
took more than a year after the mother's death for the adoption to be approved.
Much of the time was spent trying to find the father and persuading the court
that he could not be found.
99. Another problem with implied agreements is the difficulty of predicting
whether a court will find one to exist, and if so, on what terms. Unpredictability
increases insecurity in the life of the caregiver, with attendant costs to the
child's wellbeing. What must be weighed against the security issue are the
gains realized by caregivers from recognizing quasi-parental non-contractual
relationships. My prediction is that recognition of implied contracts would
usually help caregivers garner the support they need. While recognizing the
increase in insecurity for some caregivers who are challenged by people wrongly
asserting implied contracts, the balance favors recognition. Until courts begin
to recognize express and implied contracts, however, there is no way to test the
prediction.
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exclusive parenthood, a court might find the argument
appealing on the ground that a person who is not permitted to
have a relationship with a child should not be required to
support the child. Most states have rejected the reciprocal
theory, but the basis for the rejection often has little to do
with whether the child would benefit from having ties to the
abandoning parent. Instead, the rationale is that the state
should not have to support the child when the child has a
biological parent available to do the job. 100
Interdependency theory provides a solution to this
conundrum. Since interdependency theory provides that the
right to spend time with and make decisions for children
depends on a person's history of involvement with the child,
the abandoning behaviors of a biological father should be the
basis for an order that denies visitation. That order, however,
need not relieve the biological father of a financial duty
toward the child, nor does it prevent the possibility of a
relationship with the child when the child grows older. When
the mother of a one-year-old denies an interest in exclusive
parenthood, therefore, a visitation order would not be
entered. However, the mother would still be subject to the
duty of informing the biological father of the child's location
when the child reaches adolescence and to permit the child
and biological father to be in contact if the child wishes. A
mother who wants exclusive parenthood, on the other hand,
would be able to obtain such an order on the basis that the
father's abandoning behavior constitutes an implied
agreement on his part not to be a legal father. Her decision
would end the biological father's rights to further legally
sanctioned interventions in the child's life as well as his duty
to provide financial support.' It should be said that, as
100. Czapanskiy, supra note 54, at 657. Whether this rationale is sufficient
has been questioned by other commentators. See Naomi R. Cahn, Representing
Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 965, 990-92(1997); Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private
Responsibility and the Public Interest, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 372 (1989). See
also DAVID L. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY (1979).
101. The proper analogy, it seems to me, is to the situation of a divorced
parent who remarries, and the new spouse wants to adopt the child. In many
states, the failure of the legal parent to visit or support the child constitutes
abandonment. Stepparent adoption is then permitted without the consent of
the legal parent. See e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8604 (West 1994) (stating that
consent of presumed father is not required if he has failed to communicate with
and pay support for his child for one year); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(1)(a)
1004 [Vol. 39
FAMILY LAW SYMPOSIUM
always, the father has the same opportunities as others to be
a part of the child's life if he offers his support to the mother
and she accepts his support, and he reliably and respectfully
performs the supportive caregiving role he has undertaken.
By arguing that the mother agreed to become the exclusive
parent, however, he loses the right to force her to accept his
involvement in the child's life by way of judicial intervention.
Under interdependency theory, therefore, the mother has
an incentive to agree to an implied contract for exclusive
parenthood only when she believes she needs certainty about
the other parent's involvement throughout the child's
minority. If all she needs is freedom to raise a younger child
without being vulnerable to interference by an otherwise
uninvolved second parent, interdependency theory protects
her interests without mandating that she sacrifice financial
support.
Professor Polikoff is correct in recognizing that implied
contracts for exclusive parenthood means more children will
be left without court orders requiring their biological fathers
to provide financial support. I disagree, however, about
whether this is a bad thing. For instance, it appears that
orders entered solely on the basis of biology against a person
who has no interest in being involved in the child's life are
more difficult to enforce," 2 so the amount of money lost to
children's households may be fairly small. Given the
proximity to poverty in which many children live, however,
(McKinney 1988) (stating that a father of a child over six months old must
maintain "substantial and continuous repeated contact" with his child to veto
adoption). I am grateful to Jana Singer for suggesting the analogy.
102. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., et al., The Life Course of Children of
Divorce: Marital Disruption and Parental Contact, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 656, 664
(1983) (showing that there is less child support paid when the contact between
the father and the child is less frequent). See also DAVID BLANKENHORN,
FATHERLESS AMERICA (1996) ("Ultimately, meaningful child-support payments
will come only from men who see themselves as fathers. For, despite our
cultural script's unusual insistence in this instance on strategies of coercion and
vilification-calling them deadbeats, circulating Wanted posters aimed at
humiliating them-the evidence clearly shows that the mature of child support
payments depends primarily upon the nature of the father-child bond.
Typically, a stronger relationship equals more payments."). See also Marygold
S. Melli et al., Child Custody in a Changing World: A Study of Postdivorce
Arrangements in Wisconsin, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 773, 794-96 (explaining that
after three years, child support compliance is higher in cases where parents
agreed on shared custody than in cases where parents had experienced
substantial conflict over custody).
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even a small loss should be avoided unless other interests are
more important. In this case, the other interests are
incomparably more important, since exclusive parenthood
rights entitle the lead caregiver to make ongoing and
predictable decisions to assure the child's security and care.
Making a compelling case for the public support of these
children is not difficult. °3 Practically speaking, however,
getting anyone to listen to the argument remains difficult, so
it is important to recognize that most of the lead caregivers
who will agree to exclusive parenthood are unusually well-off
or are terminally ill and likely to qualify during the child's
minority for disability benefits.0 4
The Thomas S. case discussed by Professor Polikoff has
also prompted comment by Professor Barbara Woodhouse,
who has argued that what law ignores is the child's voice. '°5
She advocates that children be viewed as rights holders, but
differently from adults as rights holders. She argues that
children's rights are "needs-based" and must begin in a child's
rights to identity and continuity.'
Professor Woodhouse has explored the application of her
needs-based rights theory by examining several cases,
including the trial court's decision in Thomas S. v. Robin Y.' 7
The child, Ry, was born to Robin Y., a lesbian who intended to
raise the child with her partner, Sandra R. The biological
father was a gay man, Thomas S., who had agreed not to
assert parental rights in the child, but to be available if the
child wanted to have a relationship. Sandra R. bore a child
named Cade under similar circumstances. Because both
103. See infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
104. See 42 U.S.C.A. 416(i) (1997) (The term "disability" means: [the]inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medicallydeterminable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months); Justice v. Shalala, 842 F. Supp.251 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that a finding of disability is automatic because
AIDS is categorized as a "listed impairment" in the Code of Federal Regulation);
Naomi R. Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95
MICH. L. REV. 965, 992-93 (1997) (arguing that welfare recipients should have
same choice as wealthy women about whether to pursue child support).
105. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Out of Children's Needs, Children's
Rights". The Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. OF PUB. LAw 321(1994) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Out of Children's Needs].
106. Id.; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-
Centered Perspective on Parents'Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993).
107. 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994).
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children became curious about their origins when they were
four and five, Robin and Sandra contacted the biological
fathers. Thomas began to visit and write letters, and the
informal arrangement was sustained for several years.
Sandra and Robin told Thomas that they believed it was
important for him to treat the two girls equally and to respect
their family definition. When Ry was nine, however, Thomas
asked Robin and Sandra if he could take Ry alone with him to
California to visit his family. They refused permission and
Thomas sued, seeking a declaration of paternity and court-
ordered visitation.
The trial court denied the petition in part on the ground
that the family Ry perceived as her own did not include
Thomas as a "functional third parent." To disrupt that family
by allowing Thomas to redefine it as including him would be
harmful to Ry. The father's petition for a paternity
declaration was denied.
Woodhouse approves of both the outcome and the court's
rationale. °8 She argues that the alternative of allowing the
father to establish paternity, later adopted by the appellate
court, can be justified only on the basis of the father's
biological rights. When the trial court denied his demand for
a paternity declaration, Woodhouse says the court was
protecting Ry's own understanding of her family and valuing
that understanding over the biological alternative.
Interdependency theory would also deny Thomas's
demands for contact with Ry, but for somewhat different
reasons and through a somewhat different process. First,
while Ry was able to explain her family definition to the
court, putting her through that experience should not have
been necessary. Instead, interdependency theory trusts Ry's
caregivers to speak for her. Having done the caregiving work
for a decade, they were the adults in the best position to know
in any depth what Ry felt and experienced, and their opinions
about what was good for her should have been respected.
They believed that what was good for her was to have all the
adults who wanted close relationships with Ry to respect the
family they had defined.
It is not surprising that Ry's definition of her family
echoes those of her caregivers. At age nine or ten, she was
108. See Woodhouse, supra note 105, at 335.
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not yet old enough to have her own separate and fully formed
family definition. Interdependency theory recognizes this
reality by giving the child's voice its own hearing only when
the child is old enough to have developed an independent
point of view.
The second difference between interdependency theory
and the trial court's order in Thomas S. is that it would not
matter whether a paternity decree were entered. Woodhouse
takes the position that the only way to protect Ry from a
visitation order that would undermine her family identity
was to deny Thomas a decree of paternity.' °9 Under present
law, Woodhouse's conclusion is correct. In a formal sense, a
decree of paternity need not undermine Ry's family life
because the decree would merely empower Thomas to seek a
court order of visitation. No court would be required to grant
the request if visitation were found contrary to the child's
best interests. The problem is that the best interests test
attempts to assess what is best for the child independently of
the caregiver. By viewing the child out of her context, the
test allows a court to ignore how the child's sense of herself is
connected to her sense of her family. Following the best
interests test, most courts would order visitation so that the
biological father could have an opportunity to connect Ry to a
different family, and that would not be seen as a harmful
result."' By arguing that the only solution for Ry was to deny
her biological father a paternity decree, Woodhouse confirms
this flaw in the best interests test.
Under interdependency theory, on the other hand, the
petition for paternity could be granted with less risk for Ry's
definition of family. The court would be required to examine
what is best for the relationship between the child and the
child's lead caregiver. The court could not order visitation as
Thomas wanted it, taking only Ry to visit his family of origin,
because it would place the child in a loyalty conflict between
109. See Cahn, supra note 48, at 1-2, 35-37 (suggesting decision to find
person is a parent is conflated inappropriately with decision to permit
visitation).
110. See e.g., Skeens v. Paterno, 480 A.2d 820 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)(finding that it is in the infant's best interest to have contact with father and
the father's family despite the fact that the father and the mother never
married); see also Posey v. Powell, 956 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (finding
it in best interest of nonmarital child to have visitation with paternal
grandparents).
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her lead caregivers and a supporting caregiver over family
definition. Further, and equally as important, the child's
caregivers communicated their deeply-held values to Thomas
and asked him to respect them. When he behaved contrary to
those values, he was disrespectful of them as caregivers.
That is another reason to deny him judicial assistance to
intervene in the decision of Ry's caregivers. In other words,
interdependency theory requires that judicial interventions
be limited and that judicial power not be exercised in favor of
a person, whether a biological relative or not, who refuses to
behave in ways that respect the caregivers in doing their
work on behalf of the child.
Although interdependency theory would come to the
same result as Professor Woodhouse, the differences in her
analytical route are significant. By making the claim that the
child's needs and identity should be ascertained by speaking
directly with the child, Woodhouse opens the door to Thomas
being awarded what he sought. For example, if Ry had been
three years old instead of nine or ten when the suit was
brought, she would have lacked the capacity to make a
persuasive case about what she believed to be the appropriate
definition for her family. Allowing Thomas to decide,
contrary to the wishes and practices of Ry's caregivers, that
three-year-old Ry should be a part of his family of origin
would have been just as disruptive to Ry's sense of continuity
and to her caregivers' sense of security and control. Under
Woodhouse's theory, however, Thomas could be granted an
order of visitation because the child's definition of her family
at three is perhaps less clear and certainly less articulate
than it would be at ten.
Under interdependency theory, the ability of the
caregivers to decide on and to practice the family definition
they think preferable for themselves and for the child cannot
be disrupted by someone like Thomas, whose only claim is
biological and who has never participated in caring for the
child. If Thomas earns the right to make a claim by
committing to the child and by reliably and respectfully
participating in the child's life, then he can earn the right to
seek an order of visitation. If he does not, he can wait until
the child is older and then exercise his right to structure his
relationship directly.
Although Woodhouse's child-centered theory may be
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criticized for paying insufficient attention to the appropriate
voice of the caregiver, she is far more restrained in permitting
interventions than some theoreticians who identify
themselves as family-centered, such as David Blankenhorn
and Professors Cornel West and Sylvia Hewlett."' In their
important recent book, The War Against Parents, Hewlett and
West powerfully make the argument that American society
has largely abandoned the notion that families need support
in order to raise children.112 They demonstrate, correctly in
my view, many ways that current policies and practices
affecting work, taxation, education, and the economy are
punitive toward parents raising children. Their analysis
compares present policies with those in place for the postwar
generation of parents raising the baby boom generation.
Among their many telling examples is the change in value of
the earnings of low-income families. The minimum wage, at
one time, was high enough that a single wage earner working
a forty-hour week could earn enough money to support a
family of four at or above the poverty line."3 Today, a single
parent of two children working full-time at the minimum
wage does not earn enough to keep her family at the poverty
line."' As Hewlett and West note, the standard of living of a
low-income family is an important indicator of societal
support for all families, because parents of young children
tend to be among the youngest and lowest-paid workers."5
Hewlett and West also explore the declining value of
government benefits for families, including tax policies and
educational and housing subsidies."6 The most recent attack
is on welfare. As "reformed," welfare not only provides single
mothers with less money, but they are guaranteed benefits
for no more than five years, regardless of the children's needs
111. SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT & CORNEL WEST, THE WAR AGAINST PARENTS,
WHAT WE CAN Do FOR BELEAGUERED MOMS AND DADS (1998); see also
BLANKENHORN, supra note 102.
112. HEWLETT & WEST, supra note 111, at 29-30.
113. Matthew Miller, How to End Poverty for the Working Poor, WASH. POST,
Feb. 1, 1998, at C3 (reviewing EDMUND PHELPS, REWARDING WORK (1998), in
which Phelps argues that government should guarantee $7 to $8 an hour for
fulltime work by means of a sliding-scale tax credit to employers).
114. HEWLETT & WEST, supra note 111, at 67.
115. Id.at ch.4.
116. Id. at 103-08. See also FRANKLIN, supra note 50, at 195 (stating that the
real value of welfare benefits (including food stamps) for a family of four with no
other income fell from $10,133.00 in 1972 to $7,657.00 in 1992).
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for their mother's time and energy."7  Together, welfare
reform and the low minimum wage guarantee that children
born to young or low-skilled mothers will rarely see their
mothers because maintaining the family at the poverty line
requires that the mother work at least one full-time job."'
Indeed, given trends in the distribution of work, only the
lucky children will have mothers working a single full-time
job. More likely, the mother will cobble together a living from
several part-time jobs, none of which guarantee her access to
health insurance, family leave, or unemployment
compensation.'19
Running parallel with their trenchant and convincing
economic analysis, Hewlett and West argue that American
culture is also harming children by devaluing fathers in the
media and in legal practices.2 The result, they argue, is the
increased acceptance of non-marital childbearing and high
divorce rates among parents of young children. They argue
that the trend toward fatherlessness impairs children by
separating them from the economic, social, and emotional
support of their fathers, impairs fathers by keeping them
from their children, and impairs society by increasing the
number of men who lack the transforming and gentling
experience of living in a family.'' High on their lists of
117. 42 U.S.C.A. §608(a)(7). See also HEWLETT & WEST, supra note 111, at
235 (attacking the lifetime cap on the basis that it is "designed to force welfare
mothers into the labor force" and in doing so causes the mothers to spend a
great amount of time away from their children who are already lacking fathers).
118. For example, under the A.L.I. draft on child support, payments made to
a custodial parent earning $800 by a non-custodial parent earning $1,600 a
month would raise the custodial parent's household to 149% of the poverty line
and reduce the non-custodial parent to 150% of the poverty line. A.L.I.,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.05 37 (Tentative Draft No. 3 1998). Under the current
Maryland statute, a custodial parent with three children, working forty hours a
week at minimum wage, would still fall below the poverty line if the children's
father was working twenty hours a week at minimum wage and paying full
child support. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW. § 12-204(e) (Supp. 1997).
119. See Brendan P. Lynch, Note, Welfare Reform, Unemployment
Compensation, and the Social Wage: Dismantling Family Support under
Wisconsin's W-2 Workfare Plan, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 593 (1998); See also
Sharon Dietrich, Maurice Emsellem and Catherine Ruckelshaus, Work Reform:
The Other Side of Welfare Reform, 9 STAN. L. & POL. REV. 53 (1998).
120. HEWLETT & WEST, supra note 111, at 175-81.
121. Id. at 167-72. Their arguments echo some of those made by
Blankenhorn.
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solutions are proposals to limit access to divorce.122 Except in
rare circumstances, parents would be required to remain
married for the sake of the children. Interdependency theory
parts company with Hewlett and West on the use of legal
force to define families around the presence of fathers.
The theory begins with the proposition that children
cannot thrive, or even survive, unless at least one adult takes
responsibility for them and commits to provide them with
care. Because the notion of responsibility is central to both
interdependency theory and to Hewlett and West, it is
possible to imagine that limitations on parental divorce might
be compatible with interdependency theory. The theory,
however, turns on rights following responsibilities, not
preceding them. Limiting divorce by parents is likely to
empower people who have not accepted primary responsibility
for children and to impose burdens on those who have. Under
interdependency theory, the person who has taken on the
primary responsibility for the child must be supported, not
burdened. Burdens are allowed only to the extent that they
are necessary to encourage supportive conduct. So the
question is, does limiting divorce by parents place rights
before responsibilities?
Limiting divorce appears to burden both parents equally.
Because women initiate more divorces, 12' however, limiting
divorce statistically poses more difficulties for women than
men. But a gendered outcome is not a sufficient reason under
interdependency theory to oppose divorce limits if children
would benefit. The question one must ask, therefore, is how
keeping a mother in an unhappy marriage benefits the child.
In considering why women divorce, several things stand
out. Generally, a mother and her children suffer financially
upon divorce.'24 Sometimes they suffer poverty even if the
mother is fully employed and the father is paying child
support. 121 Knowing that her standard of living will decline
upon divorce and may never recover, why would a woman
122. Id. at 242-43. See Scott & Scott, supra note 38 (suggesting where
parties have children, it is appropriate to impose limitations on divorce at will,
such as a cooling-off period, mandatory counseling, mediation, and appointment
of guardian ad litem).
123. DEMIE KuRz, FOR RICHER, FOR POORER 43 (1995).
124. See KURZ, supra note 123, at 77-112.
125. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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with children threaten or initiate a divorce? A careful study
suggests that the situations that lead women to divorce are
often the same situations that pose problems for the children
of the marriage. The parents may be in severe conflict. The
husband may physically or emotionally abuse the wife or
children. He may make little money, gamble, or spend money
in pursuits that please him but do nothing for his family. He
may refuse to participate in household maintenance or child-
126
care.
In other words, most mothers do not lightly make the
decision to leave a marriage. 127  Removing or limiting the
right to divorce gives the father more opportunities to behave
irresponsibly, because the mother cannot threaten divorce.
The right to divorce, in other words, may give mothers a
stronger hand to persuade fathers to become more responsible
members of the household for her sake and for the benefit of
126. See AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 15, at 168, 219-20, 230 (negative
effects on children associated with parent conflict, lack of paternal involvement
in household and child care, failure to support mother in marriage and as
partner and may be related to father's other problematic characteristics); KURZ,
supra note 123, at 43-75 (discussing the various causes of divorce). In Kurz's
survey of divorced women, 19% of the women reported "violence" as the
principle reason for the divorce, 19% reported "personal dissatisfaction," 19%
reported 'other woman," 17% reported "hard-living," 16% reported no reason,
7% reported some other reason, and 3% did not know the reason. Id. at 45.
Despite the widespread entry of women into the workforce, wives continue to be
over-burdened with the housework, an additional source of frustration for many
women and sometimes even a reason for divorce. Id. at 20. See ARLIE RUSSELL
HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT 211-15 (1989).
127. Why men decide to divorce is, of course, equally as complex as why
women decide to divorce, and legal constraints are only one aspect. Also
pertinent are emotions, economics, moral beliefs, social norms, and physical and
mental health, and they may point in different directions for the same person.
While divorce is likely to enhance a man's standard of living, when measured in
purely economic terms, his affectionate life and, it appears, the quality of his
physical and mental health, is likely to decline. See Gary S. Becker et al., An
Economic Analysis of Marital Instability, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1141, 1156 (1977)
(explaining that economic instability increases probability of divorce). In
addition, the decision to divorce may differ depending on the race of the partner,
as well as the sex. One recent study found that African-American men, more
often than white men, decided to divorce because of the anxiety they
experienced about being able to provide adequately for their families.
Courtland Milloy, Black Men Must Learn Bottom Line is Family, WASH. POST,
June 3, 1998, at B1. Also, the availability of desirable new wives may be even
greater for African-American men than for white men. Id. Movements such as
Promise Keepers and events such as the Million Man March emphasize moral
arguments that men need to commit to family life. See Blankenhorn, supra
note 102.
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the children. 8
A similar story can be told about unconditional visitation
enforcement over the objections of the caregiver, another
proposal of reformers who argue that keeping fathers and
children in touch with one another is valuable for children,
for fathers, and for society."9 Interdependency theory is
strongly supportive of judicial intervention in support of
visitation, but only where it is part of ongoing, responsible,
committed, and respectful relationships between the
caregiver and the child and between the parents. These
reformers do not stop there, however."' They advocate
128. Another proposal in which Hewlett, West and Blankenhorn concur is to
give preferences to families with two married parents for some kinds of public
benefits. Such preferences, however, are more likely to burden mothers than to
give men incentives to become more responsible and committed fathers. Like
divorce limitations, economic benefits dependent on marriage tie to mothers
might improve only if the mother can make a credible threat of departure. For
women who are already single parents, allocating scarce social spending to
married parents will only make the economic situation of their children more
desperate. See FRANKLIN, supra note 50, at 219-38 (arguing that responsible
social policies require the provision of benefits to single parents because doing
otherwise is impractical and inevitably harms poor children).
The only group of women who would be likely to benefit from the preference
probably would be single women who are willing to marry, because the prospect
of economic enhancements based on marriage could help her persuade an
otherwise reluctant potential partner to marry. Since men have few other
economic inducements to marry, this help could be quite useful. If the couple
then produces children, however, maintaining access to the benefit could harm
the children, since their mother could not credibly invoke the threat of divorce
to bolster her demands for improvements in their father's behavior. In short,
mothers end up bearing the burden of a benefit designed to change men's
behavior, but women lose the possibility of changing men's behavior. But see
Amy L. Wax, The Two Parent Family in the Liberal State: The Case for Selective
Subsidies, 1 MICH. J. RACE & LAW 451 (1996).
129. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 102, at 34-36 (suggesting fatherhood is
an inhibitor to male violence); see also HEWLETT & WEST, supra note 111, at
167-73 (claiming unattached males have a greater chance of becoming violent).
130. Professors Scott and Scott argue that family law is properly moving in
the direction of awarding joint custody more commonly to divorcing parents and
to order frequent contact between the child and the noncustodial parent. SCOTT
& SCOTT, supra note 38, at 2450. Their claim is that, although the custodial
parent needs to retain greater decisionmaking authority "as ex ante
compensation for the fulfillment of more expansive obligations," the
noncustodial parent should be accorded rights as a way of encouraging him or
her to stay involved. Id. at 2449.
If maintaining a relationship with the noncustodial parent is important
to the child's welfare, then the ex ante bargain must provide for
enhanced role and relationship rewards for the parent as well as
encourage responsible conduct. Moreover, enforcement costs will be
reduced if parents are inclined voluntarily to meet their parental
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obligations, and voluntary compliance will increase with greater role
satisfaction and relationship rewards. Fiduciaries in other contexts
(including custodial parents) are motivated in part by reputational and
other non-pecuniary rewards. Non-custodial parents similarly will
respond to recognition that they have an important parental role.
Id. at 2450.
Interdependency theory differs in two respects from this position. First, I
reject the proposition that ex ante compensation in the form of legally
enforceable rights and recognition is needed to keep non-custodial parents
involved with their children. Second, rights should be accorded on the basis of
past performance, rather than on the more speculative claim that future
performance can be encouraged through legal entitlements disconnected from
performance.
The 25-year report on Judith Wallerstein's groundbreaking longitudinal
study of children of divorce is strong evidence for the interdependency approach.
Judith S. Wallerstein & Julia Lewis, The Long-Term Impact of Divorce on
Children, 36 FAMILY AND CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 368 (1998). The young
adults whose parents divorced when they were young reported that they did not
perceive a benefit from judicial intervention, including visitation orders. Even
those who regularly spent time with their noncustodial parents did not
necessarily develop longlasting or strong relationships, because many of these
parents failed to tune in to their children's needs or interests. A court order, if
anything, exacerbated the problems:
A subgroup of young people who were intensely angry at the father as
children and remained angry as adults were those who, while growing
up, were under court orders of a strictly enforced agreement to
maintain a particular schedule of visits. If the court's goal was to
promote a close a relationship between the father and child, the policy
of court-ordered visiting, in which the child had no input, not only
failed but boomeranged badly. No single child who saw his or her
father under a rigidly enforced court order or unmodified parental
agreement had a good relationship with him after reaching adulthood.
Id. at 376-77. Evidence of the lack of responsiveness of the noncustodial parent
is best evidenced in Wallerstein's information on how they treated their
children in regard to something not required by the law-college education. As
Wallerstein puts it:
Our data do not support the advice that many parents receive; that is,
that fathers who see their children regularly, who are financially
secure, and who value education, will provide the financial assistance
necessary for their children's high education. Two thirds of these
young people had fathers who were well-paid professionals or
successful businessmen. Although many had regular contact with their
children, not one of these men supported their son or daughter in full.
And, in fact, only one third of the fathers provided consistent part-time
support. The majority provided partial, inconsistent support. One
quarter of the fathers refused outright to provide any financial support
at all after their children turned 18. These data are surprising,
because many of the fathers were men for whom education had been
the stepping stone to their own achievements. Some men of culture
and learning showed little interest in their children's
education.. .Seven young people were helped financially by stepfathers.
It is interesting that those stepfathers who paid for college did so
consistently and more generously than the fathers.
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unconditional visitation enforcement in virtually every
situation, short of parental abuse of the child. 131 In my view,
unconditional visitation enforcement reinforces parental
irresponsibility because, like divorce limitations, it deprives
both the responsible caregiver and the court of opportunities
to challenge irresponsible conduct and make effective
demands for change.
A relatively mild but common example helps to illustrate
the point. Assume that a married couple divorces after seven
years. They have two children, ages six and four. Both
parents were involved with caring for the children before the
separation, with the mother doing the larger share of daily
care and arranging for daycare, medical attention, and so on.
Under an approximation theory, the mother is given
residential responsibility for seventy percent of the time and
the father for thirty percent of the time. The father and
mother both work at jobs with predictable weekday schedules
and little travel. The father is scheduled to see the children
on alternate weekends and holidays, a month during the
summer, and for dinner one evening a week. He is
responsible about seeing the children as scheduled for a year
following the divorce. Then a new relationship and more
responsibilities at work start to interfere. By the end of the
second year, he is seeing the children, on average, one
weekend a month. The mother advises the father that the
children are upset with him and miss their time together, but
his behavior does not change. The mother requests a
conference with the father to discuss changing the visitation
schedule to something they can both rely on. The father says
that is not necessary and that she should continue to have the
children available at all scheduled times regardless of
whether he will actually be there at those times. The mother
indicates her dissatisfaction and her disinclination to
The majority of the young people who received money from parents
received it from their mothers, many of whom provided consistent
although partial support. Some women did so by mortgaging their
homes. Only a few had salaries that enabled them to provide their
youngsters with financial help without great sacrifice.
Id. at 373-74.
131. Hewlett and West would go further, making such visitations not just a
judicially enforceable right, but a judicially enforceable responsibility, with fines
for non-custodial parents who do not visit their children. See HEWLETT &
WEST, supra note 111, at 244.
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continue accommodating the visitation schedule. Still, the
father's behavior does not change. After a few more months,
the mother begins to accept invitations for her and the
children for activities during times when the children are
scheduled to be with their father. He sues to enforce his
visitation rights.
Under current law, the father would prevail in the
visitation suit.3 ' Some would argue that, not only should the
father prevail, courts should be empowered and required to
use strong enforcement measures, including a change of
custody, to enforce the father's visitation rights.'33 Ensuring
that the father has continuing access to the children is the
highest and, indeed, the only priority. The problem with this
approach is that it punishes the parent who was acting
responsibly toward the children and rewards the parent who
was not. Further, it deprives the mother and the court of any
means to require the father to improve his conduct. The
father's inalienable visitation rights give him a trump card,
protecting him from examining or altering his own behavior.
Interdependency theory would not eliminate the father's
right to time with the children, but it would permit the
mother the right to amend the schedule in light of the father's
behavior. If the mother is denied the right to limit his time,
she is deprived of any method to insist that the father resume
acting responsibly with regard to the children.
Hewlett and West propose unconditional legal
interventions to preserve the father-child relationship in
132. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
133. See Russell v. Russell, 948 P.2d 561 (Wyo. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 9-105 (Supp. 1997) (stating that unjustifiable interference with visitation
is grounds for changing custody); Karen PP. v. Clyde QQ, 602 N.Y.S.2d 709
(App. Div. 1993) (upholding change of custody from mother to father based on
mother's false accusations of sexual abuse to alienate the child from the father);
Ludlow v. Ludlow, 201 P.2d 579, 582 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (changing custody
from father to mother due to father's admitted attempts to undermine the
mother's relationship with the child). Advocates use the term "Parental
Alienation Syndrome" to describe a process "by which one parent consciously
tries to divide the child, to pry the child loose from involvement with the other
parent." Kathleen Niggemyer, Parental Alienation Syndrome is Open Heart
Surgery: It Needs More Than a Band-Aid to Fix, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 567, 567
(1998). The originator of the phrase, Richard Gardner, states that it more
frequently occurs in mothers brainwashing children against their fathers. Id. at
576. Parental Alienation Syndrome has been used by advocates to justify a
change in custody to the alienated parent. Id. at 579; cf. BOWERMASTER, supra
note 15, at 453-55 (criticizing change of custody cases).
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situations far more extreme than the example just discussed.
As one example of the failure of family law to sustain the
father-child tie, they offer the story of John P. and John J., a
father and son who, in separate situations, assaulted and
killed women. They attribute the father's rage to his being
deprived of contact with his son and the son's rage to being
deprived of a father.3 1 It is a stunning story, all the more
stunning for what the authors fail to ask or explain: why did
the mother not want the father to see the child? Perhaps she
was aware of the father's capacity for violence because she
had been his target.'35 Perhaps the son had been a witness.
If she could have raised the issue when battling the father for
six years over custody and visitation, perhaps he could have
been required to take some responsibility for his violence.'
And, perhaps, he would have learned less violent ways to live
in the world. Instead, his violence went unremedied in a
visitation law regime that gave scant if any attention to the
mother's need for physical security. Although many states
allow inter-parental violence to be a factor in visitation
134. HEWLETT & WEST, supra note 111, at 170-72.
135. See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of
Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1055-58(1991) (discussing negative effects of domestic violence on children); Jane C.
Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare
"Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 742-44 (1998)
(abuse in family often affects children, whether by actual physical violence or by
their witnessing it); Janet R. Johnston, High Conflict Divorce, in THE FUTURE
OF CHILDREN, VOL. 4, NO. 1 (1994) (children exposed to high conflict relations
between parents have increased behavioral and emotional problems as well as
reduced social competence); Daniel S. Shaw & Robert E. Emery, Parental
Conflict and Other Correlates of the Adjustment of School-Age Children Whose
Parents Have Separated, 15-2 J. OF ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 270, 277-79(1987) (parental conflict in intact families and spousal abuse causes behavioral
disturbances among children. Additional stressors such as parental depression
may add to the child's problems). See generally Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic
Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on
Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q., 247, 255-56 (1993).
136. See Cahn, supra note 135, at 1062-64, 1072 (stating that domestic
violence is usually deemed irrelevant to custody decisions, or not taken
seriously); see also Czapanskiy, supra note 135, at 255-56 (stating that judges
frequently view battered women as unstable and consequently unfit parents,
which explains why lawyers often do not bring evidence of domestic violence to
the attention of courts); BOWERMASTER, supra note 15, at 449-50; Ohio v.
Brillhart, 1998 WL 470122 (Ohio App. 1998) (declaring invalid an order
conditioning father's probation on not having contact with his family for two
years, even though conviction was for assault on the mother in the presence of
one of the children).
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decisions, it is generally uncommon for visitation rights to be
conditioned on behaviors between the parents, although
conditions may be set to protect the mother from contact with
the father during visitation. Instead, it is sufficient for a
father like John P. to claim that his love for the child is
enough to entitle him to have contact with the child. His love,
however, should not be enough to sustain his claim. This
child's primary dependence and need is on his custodial
parent, the mother, and she needs the respectful support of
the child's father if she is to do her job well. Because her
need for personal security cannot be disconnected from her
capacity to be a caregiver, his capacity for violence toward her
and other women must be addressed before his visitation
rights.'37
If indeed men need contact with their children in order to
achieve their best selves, the contact must be, just as it must
be for women, contact that is characterized by responsibility,
not solely by rights. By facing the consequences of poor
behavior, whether simple inattention or actual violence, men,
like women, can change and grow. Allowing irresponsible
fathers the legal right to behave badly and still have full
access to their children is a prescription for allowing them to
continue poor behavior.
Imposing greater risks on caregivers to ensure benefits
for children could be acceptable under interdependency
theory if it could be demonstrated that the interventions
needed to create the benefits were appropriate. However,
arguments that fatherlessness is the cause of children's
misery, and that divorce limitations and unconditional
visitation enforcement are the solutions rest on shaky
empirical premises. The argument begins in the reality that,
on average, children who spend their entire childhood in the
137. The enduring pain suffered by children who observe one parent beat the
other was evidenced again in Wallerstein's study of young adults 25 years after
their parental divorce. See Judith S. Wallerstein and Julia Lewis, The Long-
Term Impact of Divorce on Children, 36 FAMILY AND CONCILIATION CTS. REV.
368, 371 (1998). The authors conclude: "the removal of the child from the
violent home does not by itself rescue even the very young child from the lasting
consequences of having witnessed the violence. Such children require intensive
psychological treatment in addition to protection from further exposure." See
Nancy Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 FLA. L. REV. 523, 535 (1996) ("Any
strategy that gives men more rights or power increases the risk of giving power
where there is already significant and widespread abuse.").
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same home with both of their biological parents have better
prospects for success as adults than children who do not.138
Where the argument falters is in the claim that since children
do better living with both a father and mother, they will also
do better when they have substantial contact with their
father after separation. The second proposition, however,
does not necessarily follow from the first. Knowing that
children do well in two-parent homes where the parents are
committed to each other and to the children is not the same
as knowing that children benefit from continuing contact with
two parents who do not live together, do not behave in similar
ways toward the child, and act disrespectfully toward one
another. Before adopting a public policy affecting children in
these situations, positive answers are needed to two critical
questions. First, given that most children whose parents
divorce and children whose parents stay together do about
the same, is it fatherlessness that accounts for the differences
between the two groups? Second, to the extent that
fatherlessness is the explanation for some of the differences,
do interventions such as divorce limitations and
unconditional visitation enforcement solve any part of the
problem?
The empirical evidence is less than clear, and does not
provide much support for draconian interventions into the
lives of caregivers and children. Professor Sara McLanahan
summarized her research by concluding that about half of the
differences in outcome turn on the poorer economic
circumstances of children in single-parent families rather
than on fatherlessness."9  Fatherlessness played a role,
according to this researcher, in that children with the best
outcomes had fathers and mothers that remained in the same
household with them throughout childhood. What the
research does not show, according to Professor McLanahan, is
that post-separation contact between the child and the father
138. "Children who grow up in a household with only one biological parent
are worse off, on average, than children who grow up in a household with both
or their biological parents." MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 51, at 2-3.
"Children who grow up in a single parent household are twice as likely to drop
out of school, twice as likely to get pregnant before the age of twenty and one
and a half times as likely to remain "idle"-out of school and out of work-in
their late teens and early twenties." Id. at 2.
139. Id. at 9-11, 61.
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changes the child's odds for success.'4 ° In other words, the
father's presence with the mother may be a key, but the
father's absence may not be.' The research does not show
that all fathers are the same.4 2  In particular, the father's
presence is not associated with success for children if the
father has exhibited violent behavior or if the father and
mother are in severe conflict.' 8
Because they lack a solid empirical basis, proposals for
unconditional visitation enforcement should be rejected as
140. Id.; AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 15, at 218-21. See also FRANK F.
FURSTENBURG, JR. & ANDRES J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS
To CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 72-73 (1991).
141. AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 15, at 203 (stating that less contact with
parent after divorce is not associated with any measures of psychological well-
being); see also NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES 29-
32 (1997) (summarizing studies showing a "correlation but not causation
between father absence and children's difficulties").
142. Indeed, Blankenhorn argues that the visiting father relationship is no
cure for fatherlessness, although he demeans the role for more than it deserves
in situations where the visiting father is a reliable and responsible presence for
the child. BLANKENHORN, supra note 102, at 124-28. Blankenhorn's theory is
that fatherhood does not work if it is disaggregated into its component parts.
Blankenhorn argues that to be of any value to his child, a father must do
everything a father's role is "supposed" to be involved with: be a breadwinner,
live with the child and "sustain a parental alliance with the mother of his child."
Id. at 128. A father who fails to perform some part of the role or who shares the
role with another is as good as no father at all. A father should not be just a
wallet, therefore; nor should he share the role of provider with the mother.
Blankenhorn's dismissal of fathers who perform the role differently and his
rejection of the worth to children of families who allocate their responsibilities
in other ways are polemical claims that are dangerous to the children in these
many families and to the people who care for them. Further, his notion that the
role of father cannot be disaggregated should be nonpersuasive in a society that
has grown accustomed to role disaggregation in so many other activities.
Mothers, for example, no longer sew all the clothes for a family. Providing
clothing is a role that is performed in part by a parent who selects and pays for
clothing, in part by a store that retails it, and in part by a manufacturing
company that creates it, not to mention the advertisers, etc. Food is not raised
at home, nor are children exclusively raised there. If the role of the mother can
be disaggregated with the result remaining satisfactory for the child, why is it
impossible to recognize and accept that the role of father also has been
disaggregation? Once the reality of the changes are seen, it becomes far easier
to accept the further reality that parental roles do not need to be reaggregated
in ways that reproduce gender or race-based cultural predisposition to "do
parenting" in only one way.
143. See supra note 135 and accompanying text; AMATO & BOOTH, supra note
15, at 219-20 ("long-term consequences of interparental discord for children are
pervasive and consistently detrimental;" where parents are in high conflict and
divorce, children benefit).
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experimental interventions into the lives of children.'
Children experience enough misery as it is; they should not
be made into experimental subjects. Some things that
children need are obvious, and providing for them is not an
experiment. As Hewlett and West document, children need
more resources.'45 They need investment in their parents,
caregivers, and communities. They need sound education and
security at home. The people children know they can rely on
are those who live with them and care for them. These are
the people deserving of support in society and in family law.'
Hewlett and West make a second argument for
unconditional visitation enforcement over the objections of
the custodial parent. Without visitation, they assert, the
father is reduced to being a wallet. Lacking involvement in
his child's life, he has no influence with the child, no affection
from the child, and no incentive to remain involved.147
Unconditional visitation enforcement, therefore, is the
natural complement to unconditional child support
enforcement. Without the former there should not be the
latter.
There is no doubt that Hewlett and West are right that
the dominant fatherhood policy of the government is that
fathers must provide financial support for their children. A
144. Jane W. Ellis, Review Essay, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. Change 253(1996) (criticizing empirical and practical bases for proposals to manage
visitation in cases of interparental conflict).
145. See supra notes 111-116 and accompanying text.
146. See FRANKLIN, supra note 50, at 219:
All available evidence shows that children minimally need one
caregiver, with assistance from a supportive adult, to care attentively
for them. Furthermore, the evaluation of the developmental outcomes
of children who were from deprived economic backgrounds and grew up
successfully suggests that they all had the common denominator of one
adult who gave them inordinate attention. Policymakers will have
greater of an impact on the lives of poor African-American children
when they accept the irreversibility of the high levels of nonmarriage
as a starting point for thinking about changes in public policy. If the
mother is drug-free, motivated to be a good mother, and considered to
be fit to rear her child, resources should be directed at fortifying the
mother-child dyad by strengthening her parenting skills.
147. Blankenhorn parts company with Hewlett and West on the issue of
responding to child support enforcement with visitation enforcement. He agrees
that "deadbeat dads" are subject to a far harsher social critique than they
deserve, but, he argues, "the only solution to the problem of Deadbeat Dads is
fatherhood," i.e., being the breadwinner who lives with the child and "sustains a
parental alliance with the mother." BLANKENHORN, supra note 102, at 124-28.
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major component of welfare reform concerns enhancing child
support collection efforts, and states are allowed to deny cash
assistance to welfare recipients who refuse to cooperate in
child support collection efforts.' They are also correct to
assert that more government funding must be dedicated to
the needs of children, especially in families where parents
lack the capacity to sustain the child. Indeed, for many of
these families, government policy toward increasing reliance
on private family support for children can only mean financial
disaster for the children, as Hewlett and West demonstrate.
They are misguided, however, in asserting that the proper
response to unconditional child support enforcement and a
government policy that overemphasizes the role of father as
wallet is unconditional visitation enforcement over the
objections of the child's caregiver. More successful, from the
child's perspective, are policies that emphasize parental
responsibility. This includes financial responsibility and,
equally important, the parent's commitment to the child and
willingness to support the child, either directly or indirectly
through the child's caregiver.
Hewlett and West are correct that an involved parent is
more likely to feel affection for the child, to want to do things
for the child, and to be more willing to share his or her
resources with the child. The question is whether
unconditional visitation enforcement is the way to achieve
involvement. Interdependency theory advocates giving the
nonresidential parent incentives to support the residential
parent, financially and otherwise. The child benefits in two
ways. First, the residential parent, having more resources to
draw on and less conflict to contend with, is able to devote
more of himself or herself to the child. Second, the
nonresidential parent, having shown his or her willingness to
support the residential parent financially and with time and
148. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(2) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring states to adopt
a child support enforcement program); 42 U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq. (West Supp.
1998) (providing for location of noncustodial parents and establishment of
paternity); Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105-87, 112
Stat. 618 (1998) (establishing felony violations for failure to pay child support).
See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a)(2) (West Supp. 1998) (establishing penalties for
welfare recipients who do not cooperate in child support efforts); Naomi R.
Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 965, 973-74 (1997) (explaining how child support assignment and
cooperation requirements work).
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energy, will be more welcome in the child's home. The child
will understand that he or she is important to both adults.
The contrast between the two approaches was
demonstrated in a pair of newspaper articles in the
Washington Post on the same day. One article described a
fatherhood support program designed to help nonresident
fathers of children on welfare obtain employment so they
could provide child support.9 The program is not a father-as-
wallet project, however, because it also helps the men learn
how to be better fathers in other ways. The fathers in the
program are poor and their child support obligations exceed
their ability to pay. But some want to be involved in their
children's lives, and they are learning that the size of their
wallet is not the only measure of their ability to be a good
father. Rather than fight the mothers for visitation, they are
learning to offer support, and it is this support that
interdependency theory says should be encouraged. For
example, one father of three children by three different
mothers is described in the article as owing approximately
$16,000.00 in back child support. He is unemployed, ill, and
has a criminal record that includes assault charges. Knowing
that he cannot be a wallet for his children has not convinced
him to abandon them, however. He understands that the
mothers of the children need help, since all are working, and
he is offering to care for the children when the mothers are at
work. As the program administrator says, although society
wants these men to become wallets, it is an unlikely outcome.
What the program can do is help men be involved in their
children's lives and develop civil relationships with the
mothers. Nowhere in the article is there mention of
unconditional visitation enforcement being necessary for this
to happen.
The second article describes the creation of "child-
transfer sites," that is, supervised sites where impartial
observers monitor the exchange of children when they leave
one parent and go to another.5 ' Some parents cannot manage
these transitions peacefully and, for others, it is a "difficult
and emotional experience." These sites are said to be
149. Judith Havemann, Helping Absent Dads Take Responsibilities:
"Fatherhood"Programs Offer Support, WASH. POST, June 8, 1998, at Al.
150. Jacqueline L. Salmon, Child-Transfer Sites Burgeoning, WASH. POST.,
June 8, 1998, at C8.
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"burgeoning." One must ask, however, how a child feels when
his or her parents are so alienated from one another that they
cannot be civil to one another in front of their child. Perhaps
the money that supports child-transfer sites would be better
spent teaching parents how to be minimally respectful of one
another so that they can manage their own transfers. And,
where minimal respectfulness is impossible, interdependency
theory would be a basis for terminating judicially-mandated
visitation until the child is old enough to arrange his or her
own transfers.
IV. INTERDEPENDENCY THEORY IN PRACTICE
Reforming the law to serve the needs of the
caregiver/child unit for support is not a simple undertaking.
In this part of the article, I show how the law would change
under interdependency theory with regard to visitation.
Currently, the law will almost never deny a parent's right to
visitation."' While the presumption that favors visitation is a
simple rule, interdependency theory identifies situations
where visitation will impede caregiving. I will discuss three
examples.
The first example is a father's claim for visitation with a
child born to a woman not living with him. For several years
after the birth, the father does very little either to support the
mother or relate to the infant. The mother and child form a
secure caregiver/child unit and develop relationships with
people and institutions in the community that support the
mother's caregiving work. The father realizes what he is
missing and sues the mother to establish a visitation
schedule.
The second example involves a claim for visitation by a
father who was married to and living with the mother until
the child was two years old. A visitation order was entered as
part of the divorce decree, under which custody was awarded
to the mother. The father spent alternate weekends with the
child for the first year after the divorce. After that, at the
father's election, their time together became more irregular.
When the child was four, the father remarried. That year, he
saw the child on her birthday. The next year, he arranged no
visits at all. Early the next year, when the child was six, the
151. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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father told the mother that he would be taking the child on
his family's summer vacation for three weeks in another
state. When the mother told the child, the child said she did
not want to go because she did not like her father any more.
When the mother told the father about the child's reaction,
the father said that was no reason for the child not to go. The
mother said she would not allow the father to take the child
and the father sued to enforce his right to visitation.
The third example is a claim for visitation by a
grandmother with whom the father and the child lived from
the time of the child's first birthday until the child was three.
After the mother left and refused to pay child support, the
father lost his apartment and moved in with the
grandmother. The father's earnings, after daycare expenses,
were insufficient to pay rent. The grandmother agreed to
provide the father and grandchild with a place to live until
the father improved his financial situation. When the
father's salary increased and the child was able to attend a
Headstart Center, he could afford to move out. His fianc6
believed she could establish a better relationship with the
child if the child spent less time with the grandmother, so the
grandmother and grandchild saw very little of each other
after he and the father moved out. When her son refused her
request to see the child more often, she sued.
Each example raises two questions under
interdependency theory. The first is whether the lead
caregiver may permit the person who is seeking visitation to
see the child. The answer is yes. The lead caregiver has that
authority and probably will exercise it in favor of visitation if
he or she believes that contact will benefit the child and
support the lead caregiver's efforts in raising the child. The
second question is whether a court should intervene if the
lead caregiver decides against visitation. It is more difficult
and involves both procedural and substantive issues.
All three cases require an examination of process,
because the impact of judicial proceedings on a caregiver/child
unit is not insubstantial. If judicial intervention is allowed,
the lead caregiver will have the burden of asserting his or her
position in court. This requires hiring and paying for a
lawyer, missing work to go to court, and possibly hiring
experts and recruiting fact witnesses. The time and money
the lead caregiver expends on the legal effort is time and
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money that cannot be spent on the child, so judicial
intervention results in a material detriment to the
caregiver/child unit. In addition, the legal process can be
stressful, especially if the outcome is in doubt. An insecure
lead caregiver is likely to transmit her fears and concerns to
the child, who may suffer emotionally along with her.'
The three examples differ somewhat in terms of how they
would be treated at present in the United States. The law in
most states permits visitation by a non-custodial parent
unless the custodial parent can demonstrate that the
visitation would be harmful to the child, usually because the
non-custodial parent has been abusive or neglectful of the
child, or because he or she engages in behaviors, such as
substance abuse, that will endanger the child.5 3 So the two
fathers are likely to prevail in their claims for visitation. The
fact that the custodial parent believes that sharing the child's
time with the other parent will cause an unwarranted
disruption in the successful routines of the caregiver/child
unit is not a reason to deny visitation. Nor is it a reason to
deny visitation for the custodial parent to show that the non-
custodial parent pays no attention to her when she tries to
explain what the child likes to do, who the child's best friends
are, or what the child likes to eat. And, it is not considered a
good reason to deny visitation when the custodial parent
shows that the non-custodial parent has repeatedly harassed
or coerced her."' Even if the conduct amounts to physical
152. See BOWERMASTER, supra note 15, at 433-36 (detailing emotional,
physical, and financial costs to a woman during 2 -year effort to obtain court
order allowing her to move with child away from abusive former husband).
153. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
154. Courts typically uphold a parent's right to visitation despite repeated
harassment or coercion, but restraining orders may be issued in an attempt to
protect the victimized parent. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:16I(d)
(1992) (courts may issue a temporary or permanent restraining order on parent
to force that party to refrain from "harassing, intimidating or threatening the
other party"); Petraglia v. Petraglia, 392 N.Y.S.2d 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)
(altering, but not denying, visitation rights in order to protect mother from ex-
husband's harassment when collecting his child for visitation); Bazzano v.
Bazzano, 175 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (restraining father from
harassing his ex-wife while still retaining his visitation rights with his child);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-101.1(c) (Supp. 1997) ("If the court finds that a
party has committed abuse against the other parent of the party's child... the
court shall make arrangements for custody or visitation that best protect the
child who is the subject of the proceeding, and the victim of the abuse."); A.L.I.,
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violence or a threat of physical violence against the custodial
parent, visitation will be allowed if arrangements can be
made that are, in the eyes of the court, sufficient to protect
her.1
55
Two reasons are commonly given in support of judicial
intervention: 1) contact with both parents is beneficial to the
child, and 2) parents have a right to see their children.'56 The
fact that the child lives in a caregiver/child unit is irrelevant
to both rationales. Therefore, if judicial intervention impairs
the caregiver's decisional autonomy and her sense of security
and, as a result, impairs the caregiver's ability to care for the
child, that is also irrelevant.
The twin rationales supporting judicially mandated
visitation by uninvolved parents could serve equally well to
support judicially mandated visitation by uninvolved
biological parents after a child has been adopted.'57 In the
case of adoption, contact with the biological parents could
benefit the child. It might give the child a better sense of who
he is or where she came from. It might provide the child with
a more secure sense that the biological parents decided on
adoption out of love rather than rejection. The biological
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.20 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1998) (if parent found to have
engaged in [abuse], court may not allocate custodial responsibility or
decisionmaking responsibility to that parent without making special written
findings that child and other parent can be adequately protected from harm).
155. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
156. See e.g., Donovan v. Donovan, 212 N.W.2d 451 (Iowa 1973) (granting
father increased visitation since age of the children and father's remarriage
created a possibility of establishing a better relationship with his children);
Lloyd R. v. Linda R., 607 N.Y.S.2d 352 (App. Div. 1994) (affirming lower court's
preference for enforcing visitation despite a child's displeasure with her father,
on the grounds that the relationship may eventually improve); Skeens v.
Paterno, 480 A.2d 820 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984); Smith v. Higginbotham, No.
535, 1984 WL 5630 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug 31, 1984).
157. The fact that an adoption has occurred and the adoptive parents have
become the child's sole legal parents is not sufficient to distinguish the two
situations, because courts have required adoptive parents to permit access to
grandparents. See CZAPANSKIY, supra note 22; People ex rel. Sibley v.
Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d 1049 (N.Y. 1981) (allowing grandparents to visit
grandchild over adoptive parent's objections); In re Adoption of Anthony, 448
N.Y.S.2d 377 (Fam. Ct. 1982) (granting visitation to allow a twelve-year-old
child to have contact with other siblings). See also Thrift v. Baldwin, 473 S.E.2d
715 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that grandparents and siblings have standing
to seek visitation after adoption of relative). The legal parenthood title,
therefore, is not without its limits. See Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended Family
System in the Black Community: A Child-Centered Model for Adoption Policy,
68 TEMP. L. REV. 1649 (1995).
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parents might be able to give the child access to opportunities
not available from the adoptive parents. Conversely, the
biological parents could benefit from contact with the child.
They could gain a sense of acceptance about their decision,
especially if the child is thriving in the adoptive home. Their
satisfaction with the adoption might be communicated to
other people who might then contemplate adoption in a more
favorable light and be motivated to place a child for adoption.
Despite all the potential benefits of judicially mandated
visitation by previously uninvolved biological parents with an
adopted child, courts and legislatures do not support it. Open
adoption laws, in fact, take the opposite position. In the
absence of a voluntary agreement by the adoptive parents to
permit contact with the biological parents, adoptive parents
generally cannot be ordered even to identify themselves to the
biological parents during the child's minority. Why are
adoptive parents insulated from intervention by biological
parents? A major purpose is to enable adoptive parents to
create and maintain the best possible caregiver/child unit.
Allowing the judicial process to intervene in that relationship
may result in a loss of autonomy and a sense of insecurity in
the adoptive parents.' Rather than allow interventions that
might jeopardize the successful raising of a child, judicial
intervention is not permitted, regardless of how beneficial it
might be.
Interdependency theory posits that the lead caregiver in
the caregiver/child unit must be accorded much more
deference and the court much less latitude. In the case of the
never-involved biological parent, in example one, the court
could not order visitation while the child is young. A rule
prohibiting judicial intervention would not prohibit the
158. In her examination of the dilemma of balancing the child's need for
parental attachment against the child's need for a personal and cultural
identity in the context of transracial adoption, Professor Woodhouse concludes,
consistently with interdependency theory, that the child's need to attach to a
family should have priority during the child's early years. As the child matures,
she or he should have opportunities to identify as well with the family and
group into which she was born. The duty of the adoptive parents and the
society at large, therefore, would be to recognize and protect the young child's
"need for continuity in her psychological or social family" while, simultaneously,
recognizing and protecting the child's access to her or his heritage as the child
matures. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Are You My Mother?": Conceptualizing
Children's Identity Rights in Transracial Adoptions, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POLVY 107, 128 (1995).
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caregiver from deciding that visitation is beneficial to the
child. It would, however, prohibit a court from making that
decision for her. The caregiver would be treated like the
adoptive parents who refuse to contract for an open adoption.
Just as adoptive parents are given the privacy to raise their
children without contact with previously uninvolved
biological parents, single caregivers would be given the
privacy to raise their children without contact with a
previously uninvolved biological parent. Once the child has
outgrown the need for the caregiver to intermediate between
the child and the world, the need to protect and support the
caregiver/child unit is less. At that point, the identity of an
adopted child's adoptive family can be revealed to the
biological parents, and the identity of the biological parents
revealed to the child. Similarly, once the child raised by a
single caregiver is older, the previously uninvolved biological
parent should be told the child's location and permitted the
opportunity to establish a relationship. Before that time,
however, judicially mandated visitation should not be
allowed.
What can the uninvolved biological father do to remedy
the situation in the first example? Since he is denied the
opportunity to use the courts to help him develop contact with
the child, he must try to win the mother's cooperation. He
could try intimidation, but that will not serve his goals,
because, under interdependency theory, no visitation will be
ordered if the proposed visitor behaves disrespectfully
towards the caregiver. His better option is to offer the mother
some support in her role as lead caregiver. Perhaps she is in
need of help with the child at particular times when he is free
and she needs to be at work. Perhaps she needs some help
persuading a school to provide the child with certain services.
Perhaps she needs some financial assistance. When he
begins to do supportive caregiving work, two things may
begin to happen. First, he begins to develop a relationship
through which the lead caregiver can see if he is reliable and
respectful. Second, he begins to develop a claim for judicial
intervention, because interdependency theory opens the door
for an order of visitation to be entered in favor of someone
who has behaved as a supporter of the caregiver for a period
of time.
In the second example, where the father dropped out, the
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mother should prevail under interdependency theory. Being
a supporting caregiver is not easy. As many as half of
parents with visitation rights fail to exercise them.159 Just as
in the example, it is not an unusual pattern for the father to
grow increasingly unreliable over several years.16
Interdependency theory would not take the first or second
instance of unreliability as evidence that he has withdrawn
from his role as supporting caregiver. But the theory does
recognize that a supporting caregiver can, in effect,
demonstrate that he has "resigned" over time by failing to
exercise his visitation rights. His resignation imposes costs
on both the child and the lead caregiver. The child loses
contact with a person whom the child wants to trust and rely
on. The lead caregiver loses a person who had provided
support. Refusing to recognize a resignation and leaving the
door fully open to the supporting caregiver-including access
to judicial remedies-imposes additional costs. The lead
caregiver owes certain duties to the supporting caregiver,
such as respectfulness and reliability. When the supporting
caregiver fails to perform the role, the lead caregiver needs to
be relieved of the complementary responsibilities and get on
with the task of raising a child in circumstances with less
support. The lead caregiver may want to move to a different
city, for example, and should not have to contend in court
with opposition from a formerly supporting caregiver on the
basis that he or she may want to resume a relationship with
the child in the future.' The lead caregiver may want to
159. CZAPANSKIY, supra note 22, at 1449.
160. See CZAPANSK1Y, supra note 54; FRANK F. FURSTENBURG, JR. &
ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN
PARENTS PART 17-18 (1991) (explaining that fathers are frequently discouraged
from continuing contacts with their children after divorce); Judith S.
Wallerstein & Julia Lewis, The Long-Term Impact of Divorce on Children: A
First Report From a 25-Year Study, 36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 368,
374-75 (1998) (stating that non-custodial father's contact with children
fluctuates wildly depending on his sense of success or failure); Constance R.
Ahrons, Predictors of Paternal Involvement Postdivorce: Mothers' and Fathers'
Perceptions, J. DIVORCE, Spring 1983, at 55, 67 (suggesting that the
relationship between the two parents has a significant effect on noncustodial
father's involvement with children after divorce); Mary Ann P. Koch & Carol R.
Lowery, Visitation and the Nonresidential Father, J. DIVORCE, Winter 1984, at
47, 62 (stating that noncustodial fathers report the need to compromise with
custodial mother to maintain regular contact with their children).
161. When applying the change in circumstances test to decide whether a
parent should be allowed to relocate with minor children, courts often examine
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establish a relationship with another adult who could become
a supporting caregiver, but she may be deterred by the
continuing enforceability of the visitation order favoring the
former supporting caregiver because the new relationship
might also result in a visitation order and the combination
would be too disruptive of her caregiving."62
Again, a decision to deny a formerly supporting caregiver
of judicially-enforceable visitation is not the same as a
decision to cut off his or her contact with the child, although
it may have the same impact. Some parents voluntarily
arrange visitation with people, who have no legal right to see
a child, especially if the parent sees the experience as an
whether the non-moving parent will be able to continue to exercise the custodial
responsibilities the parent is entitled to. If the non-moving parent has been
absent from a child's life, however, relocation by the custodial parent should not
satisfy the change in circumstance standard, as some courts and commentators
have noted. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.20 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1998); In re
Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1996) (concluding that it is necessary
to focus on the "practical impact of a custodial order upon the children, not just
the legal consequences"); Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn. 1993)
(reversing order prohibiting relocation of mother and minor because father had
not made himself available for scheduled visitations).
162. Professors Scott and Scott agree that it is appropriate to allow a single
parent to terminate the visitation rights of an "Enoch Arden" parent, the
noncustodial parent who disappears. SCOTT & SCOTT, supra note 38, at 2470-
72. Continuing to accord such parents unconditional visitation rights, they
argue correctly, serves to "vindicate parental rights without promoting
responsibility and commitment, often at the cost of the child's relationship with
a functional parent." Id. at 2471. They differ from interdependency theory,
however, in proposing an all or nothing solution. Terminating visitation rights
for the Enoch Arden parent, in their view, requires terminating his parental
rights. Id. Unless the custodial parent is willing to forego child support,
therefore, she cannot deprive the disappearing parent of his right to
unconditional visitation. As explained earlier, I view terminating parental
rights as an unnecessary and destructive move that may disserve an older child
and that serves to insulate a wealthy custodial parent from the demands of an
Enoch Arden parent while leaving the economically vulnerable custodial parent
exposed. In addition, a parent who has deprived a child of his or her personal
involvement should not be rewarded financially. Indeed, there is better reason
to increase his child support to cover costs of nonvisitation. See CZAPANSKIY,
supra note 22; HEWLETT & WEST, supra note 111, at 243-44. Finally, in my
view, the Enoch Arden parent should have the opportunity to connect with the
child once the child is an adolescent, since such contact is not as likely to
undermine the custodial parent's capacity to do his or her best for the child
during the child's younger and more dependent years. I leave open the
termination option, however, if the custodial parent is firmly convinced that
later contact with the Enoch Arden parent is wrong for the child and worth the
financial cost to the parent.
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appropriate and beneficial one for the child."3 The mother in
the example may conclude, based on her deep knowledge of
the child, that the child's resistance to the father's vacation
plans has less to do with the child's feelings for the father
than it has to do with a reluctance to be away from playmates
for so long. The mother could suggest that the father plan a
vacation involving the child for only one week, and the child's
response may be more positive. On the other hand, if the
mother is forced into accepting three weeks or nothing, based
on a ruling by a judge who has much less information, and
after a proceeding which has cost scarce funds, it is less likely
that she will be moved to make the suggestion. The father
may also try to improve his legal situation by attempting to
see the child on a more regular basis. While the mother may
refuse, it is more likely that requests for visits that
complement her schedule will be well received."" After
spending some time as a supporting caregiver, the father will
regain a legal entitlement to visitation. Further, when the
child becomes older, probably in her early teens, she will have
the right to decide for herself if she wishes to spend time with
her father.
The grandparent visitation example is the one most
likely to result in a visitation order under interdependency
theory. At present, the rule in most states would result in a
visitation award for the grandmother. 5  The reasons,
however, would differ from the reasons under
interdependency theory. The typical situation in a
grandparent visitation case now involves previously married
163. HEWLETT & WEST, supra note 111, at 157-59, presents one such
example. A boy named Juan had a father who had been in prison for many
years. His mother, not wanting him to forget his father, took Juan to visit his
father in prison every weekend for years.
164. Of course, a custodial mother who remains angry with her ex-husband,
for real or imagined reasons, is far less likely to cooperate, even if his requests
are polite and he is willing to accommodate her schedule and needs. Everyone
who has practiced family law or spoken with friends or family about their
divorce knows at least one example. The number may be far smaller than we
suspect, however, because legal actors are not accustomed to counseling
noncustodial fathers about the importance of being consistent, reliable and
supportive visitors, nor do we insist that visiting parents demonstrate courtesy
or respect toward their former partners. Rather, we turn our attention toward
entitlement. He has a "right" to visitation, so why must he be polite, supportive
or reliable in exercising the right?
165. CZAPANSKIY, supra note 22, at 1331.
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parents. The child is in the mother's custody and spends
alternate weekends and holidays with the father. The
father's parents want to spend more time with the child than
the father affords. Their relationship with the child has been
typical for grandparents in the United States. That is, they
see the child on special occasions, approximately once a
month. When their contact declines after divorce, courts in
most states would award visitation. The formal standard is
the best interests of the child, and the claim is that the child
benefits from continuing contact with the father's family. 166
Under interdependency theory, the grandmother's claim
for visitation arises out of her willingness to support the lead
caregiver in his time of need, as demonstrated by taking both
father and child into her household. During their period of
co-residency, she may have sacrificed privacy, money, and
time. She may have become more involved with and quite
devoted to the child. Children need people who are willing to
support them and their lead caregivers in this way, or their
lives become much more difficult. The altruism of these
supporters needs to be recognized and encouraged. Thus,
supporters should not be deprived of access to the child,
unless they are incapable of being respectful of the caregiver.
The contrast between interdependency theory and the
best interests test in most grandparent visitation decisions is
about behavior as compared to status. There is little evidence
that a relationship with grandparents per se is of great
importance to most children.'67 What is more important for
the child is what the grandparents do, not who they are. And
one of the most important things they can do is help the
child's lead caregiver through a time of stress.
Interdependency theory does not recognize grandparenthood
as a status entitling a person to judicially enforced visitation.
Instead, it recognizes the contributions a grandparent-or
any other supporting caregiver-may provide as the basis for
a judicially enforced visitation order.
V. CONCLUSION
Interdependency theory is a back-to-basics idea. A child
needs a caregiver, and a caregiver needs help from other
166. Id. at 1348.
167. Id. at 1324, 1330.
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people and from social institutions. Conversely, society is
dependent on the caregiver(s) to raise the child well enough
that the child joins society with reasonable physical and
mental health and sufficient skill to be a productive member
of the culture.
Viewing the child within the reality of the child's
connection with, and dependency on, the caregiver, rather
than as an independent actor, alters the ways law should
intervene in the lives of children. Rather than claiming to
intervene directly, legal actors must acknowledge that
interventions run through the caregiver or caregivers, and
that the caregiver's need for support as a caregiver must be
the focus. In the context of visitation, interdependency theory
mandates that the proposed visitor be a person who has more
than an abstract, status-based claim to the child's time. The
goal is to reward people who behave in supportive ways, so
caregivers can do what the child needs. For a proposed
visitor to be able to assert the force of law, therefore, he or
she must demonstrate a history of supporting the child
through supporting the caregiver. Further, the visitor must
continue to behave supportively of the caregiver and child
throughout the course of the judicially mandated visitation.
Interdependency theory has implications within family
law in matters such as custody, child support, and alimony.
It also has implications for other social policies that impact on
the lives of children, such as public benefits, education policy.
and conditions of employment. What is fundamental is that
interdependency theory should serve to remind legal and
policy decision-makers that people who care for children do
society a great service. Caregivers are the people that we, as
a society, have entrusted with the task of nurturing and
protecting children. Without their commitment and devotion,
children will either die or grow up without achieving their
potential. Caregivers cannot do this alone. They need the
village, to use a popular metaphor. The village, in modem
American terms, may consist of family members, friends who
have become like family, employers, educators, churches, and
bureaucrats. If we allow the village to ignore caregivers, we
are all diminished. Interdependency theory takes us back to
the basic idea that the child needs the caregiver, the
caregiver needs support, and we, the potential supporters,
need the caregiver.
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